Investigation Versus Prosecution: The Constitutional Limits on Congress\u27s Power to Immunize Witnesses by Sklamberg, Howard R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 78 | Number 1 Article 6
11-1-1999
Investigation Versus Prosecution: The
Constitutional Limits on Congress's Power to
Immunize Witnesses
Howard R. Sklamberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
CONGRESS'S POWER TO IMMUNIZE
WITNESSES
HOWARD R. SKLAMBERG*
For more than a century, Congress has exercised an unchecked
power to immunize any witness it chooses, regardless of the Justice
Department's wishes. Howard Sklamberg points out that when
Congress grants immunity, it prevents prosecutors from enforcing
the law. This interference conflicts with the bedrock principle of
separation of power between the legislative and executive
branches. Mr. Sklamberg concludes that although Congress
occasionally may need to immunize witnesses to uncover
important facts, Congress's power to grant immunity must be
limited to those cases in which immunizing a witness is critical to a
congressional investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1862, Congress launched an investigation into allegations of
bribery and corruption in the management of public lands. A House
committee granted immunity to two Interior Department clerks who
had embezzled government bonds.' Although the committee got the
testimony it wanted, the witnesses escaped prosecution. An outraged
Senator protested: "Here is a man who stole two million in bonds, if
you please, out of the Interior Department. What does he do? He
gets himself called as a witness before one of the investigating
committees and testifies something in relation to that matter, and
then he cannot be indicted."2 The House committee chose testimony
over justice.
Congress has granted immunity many times since 1862, and many
guilty people have escaped justice. On occasion, the Justice
1. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 428-31 (1862); Kristine Strachan, Self-
Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REv. 791, 798 n.23 (1978).
2. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 428 (1862) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see
also Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 189,254 (1967) (quoting Sen. Trumbull).
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Department has asked Congress not to immunize a witness, but the
choice has been Congress's alone to make. Congress has exercised a
unilateral power to immunize whomever it wants, regardless of the
Justice Department's wishes.3
This Article argues that Congress's authority to grant immunity
is much more limited than is commonly presumed. When itimmunizes a witness, Congress prevents a prosecutor from enforcing
the law. In doing so, Congress impinges upon a basic principle of
separation of powers, namely that the legislative branch may not
interfere with or play any role in the execution of the law. Even
though Congress occasionally must immunize a witness in order to
uncover important facts in an investigation, Congress should only
have the power to immunize witnesses in those cases in which
granting immunity is critical to its investigation.
Part I addresses the consequences of congressional grants of
immunity. Congress had hoped that the modem immunity statute
would provide witnesses with just enough protection to satisfy the
Fifth Amendment, but would not prevent the guilty from being
brought to justice This hope has not been realized. To convict
someone who has been immunized by Congress, a prosecutor must
show, among other things, that no trial witness has been tainted by
immunized congressional testimony.5  When Congress hears
immunized testimony in public session, as it aimost always does, a
prosecutor rarely will be able to meet this burden. Thus, a
congressional grant of immunity makes a subsequent conviction
almost impossible.
Part II explores the constitutional implications of this
congressional power to derail a prosecution. It discusses four of the
Supreme Court's more prominent separation-of-powers cases:
Bowsher v. Synar,6 Morrison v. Olson,7 Buckley v. Valeo,8 and INS v.
Chadha.9 Although portions of these four opinions are confusing and
3. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 24-114 and accompanying text.
5. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 373-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United
States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
6. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see also infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Bowsher).
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing
Morrison).
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see also infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text
(discussing Buckley).
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (discussing
Chadha).
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circular, they stand for the basic principle that Congress may play no
part in enforcing the laws that it passes. When Congress immunizes a
witness and prevents a federal prosecutor from bringing a guilty party
to justice, it plays a destructive role in the enforcement of our
criminal law. The power to grant immunity is, therefore,
constitutionally problematic.
Part III considers a counterargument to the notion that granting
immunity is unconstitutional. Although the Constitution does not
specifically empower Congress to conduct investigations, Congress
has exercised this authority since the 1790s.11 The Supreme Court has
upheld this power, reasoning that Congress "cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information."" In recognizing that
Congress must have the means to obtain necessary information, the
Court has concluded that Congress possesses broad subpoena
power.' 2 In a sense, granting immunity is like issuing a subpoena-
both are necessary for Congress to obtain important evidence. Why,
then, should Congress not have a broad power to immunize
witnesses?
Part IV answers this question. It shows that courts have curbed
Congress's power to investigate when an exercise of that power would
encroach on the authority of another branch of government or would
otherwise disturb the separation of powers. 3 For example, when
Congress demands information protected by executive privilege, it
does not enjoy its usual broad subpoena power. Instead, its power is
limited to information that is "demonstrably critical" to an
investigation. 4
Part V argues that Congress should have the power to immunize
a witness only when doing so is "demonstrably critical" to an
investigation. This standard recognizes that Congress may need
immunized testimony to obtain important evidence, but that
Congress's power to grant immunity is constitutionally problematic
and should be limited.' 5 This proposed limitation on congressional
authority to immunize would have two exceptions: when an
immunized witness testifies in secret and when the Attorney General
or an independent counsel' 6 does not object to a grant of immunity.'7
10. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
11. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
12. See itL; infra notes 198-206.
13. See infra notes 229-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 248-73 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 274-89 and accompanying text.
16. The statute authorizing the appointment of independent counsels expired on June
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In both cases, immunity's separation-of-powers difficulties recede,
and Congress's authority to immunize need not be limited. But these
exceptions rarely are applicable, and, most of the time, a
congressional grant of immunity would have to pass the
"demonstrably critical" test.
Part VI discusses how a court would apply the "demonstrably
critical" test. Under the modem immunity statute, Congress itself
does not have the authority to grant immunity. Instead, it submits an
application to a federal district court, which then performs what is
now a largely ministerial task of ordering a witness to testify. 8 Under
the new test, the court's role would no longer be ministerial because it
would apply the "demonstrably critical" test before ordering a
witness to testify.' 9 The test would not be difficult to administer. It is
identical to the standard used to evaluate grand-jury subpoenas that
seek information protected by executive privilege. Part VI concludes
that the "demonstrably critical" standard is both manageable and
justiciable.20
I. TnE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF
IMMUNITY
A. The Origins of the Modem Congressional Immunity Statute
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 21
Although the Amendment mentions only criminal cases, a witness
may assert the privilege against self-incrimination "in any
proceeding,"' including a congressional investigationy
30, 1999, but allowed counsels who had already been appointed to continue their
investigations. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 599 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (expired). Because of this
grandfather clause and because Congress may, one day, reauthorize the statute, this
Article addresses the relationship between congressional grants of immunity and
independent counsels. See infra note 72.
17. See infra notes 290-311 and accompanying text.
18. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999).
19. See infra notes 312-34 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 335-70 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a catalog of the "aspirations furthered by the Fifth
Amendment," see United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690-91 (1998), and Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
22. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
23. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957); Emspak v. United States,
349 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). Congress
has long recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to its
investigations. In 1834, Nicholas Biddle and other directors of the Bank of the United
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To obtain testimony from witnesses who invoke their Fifth
Amendment fights, Congress has passed a series of immunity laws.24
Some of these laws proved defective-either because they provided
witnesses with such broad immunity that many guilty people escaped
prosecution 2s or because they granted such narrow immunity that
they did not adequately protect witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights.2
When Congress passed the present immunity statute, it hoped to
avoid these pitfalls.27
Congress enacted the first immunity law in 1857, 8 in response to
a report that members of the House of Representatives had asked a
New York Times correspondent to serve as an intermediary in a vote-
selling scheme.29 The reporter asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to tell a House committee which
congressman had approached him.30 Congress immediately passed a
statute that empowered congressional committees to compel
witnesses to provide self-incriminating testimony, but guaranteed that
"no person examined and testifying before either House ... shall be
held to answer criminally... for any fact or act touching [matters on]
which he shall be required to testify."31
This broad form of immunity, termed "transactional immunity, '32
proved to be a disaster. Witnesses took "immunity baths," in which
they admitted all of their criminal activity and were forever protected
from prosecution.33 Congressional committees became "a kind of
States based their refusal to produce subpoenaed documents to a House committee on the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND
INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 193 (1955). Although
members of the committee disagreed as to whether Biddle's assertion of the privilege was
proper, they agreed that the privilege applied to congressional investigations. See H.R.
REP. No. 23-481, at 11 (1834) ("It is a humane rule to be found in criminal law, which
declares that no man shall be compelled to criminate himself, and one which the
committee would be unwilling under any circumstances to deny."), cited in JOHN C.
GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.2[a], at 124 n.54
(1988).
24. See infra notes 28-84 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 28-34,41-50 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
28. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155.
29. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 426-33 (1857); Strachan, supra note 1, at
797 n.22; Jerome A. Murphy, Comment, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The
Uncertain Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1992).
30. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 1014.
31. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. at 156.
32. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 1015.
33. See Michael Gilbert, Note, The Future of Congressional Use Immunity After
United States v. North, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 417, 428 (1993).
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bargain-basement confessional where easy absolution could be
secured. '34
In 1862, Congress attempted to remedy this flaw by replacing the
1857 Act with a law providing that "the testimony of a witness
examined and testifying before either House of Congress, or any
committee of either House of Congress, shall not be used as evidence
in any criminal proceeding against such witness." 35 This "simple use
immunity" statute permitted prosecutions of immunized
congressional witnesses for crimes related to their testimony as long
as the government did not use the testimony as evidence at trial. 6
Although the 1862 statute never came before the Supreme
Court, the Court held in Counselman v. Hitchcock37 that a law that
provided simple use immunity to grand-jury witnesses violated the
Fifth Amendment. 8 The Court noted that the statute only prohibited
the government from using immunized testimony at trial, but
"afford[ed] no protection against that use of compelled testimony
which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a
crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means
of convicting the witness or party."3 9 The Court concluded that a
"statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates. '40  Although Counselman did not specifically address the
constitutionality of the 1862 law, the Court's disapproval of simple
use immunity meant that the statute was unconstitutional.
Congress did not pass another immunity statute for congressional
witnesses until 1954.41 At the insistence of Senator Joseph McCarthy
34. ALAN BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION 131 (1955).
35. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11,12 Stat. 333, 333.
36. See Strachan, supra note 1, at 798.
37. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
38. See id. at 586.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745. In 1893, Congress did enact a
transactional-immunity statute that applied to witnesses before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, 444 (stating that "no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify" before the Interstate
Commerce Commission). In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court upheld the
statute. It rejected the argument that transactional immunity provided insufficient
protection because such immunity did not "shield the witness from the personal disgrace
or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime." Id. at 605. The Court held that the
Fifth Amendment was not intended "to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to
protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal
charge." Id. at 605-06. For a more detailed discussion of Brown, see infra notes 120-30
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and his allies, who wished to immunize witnesses as part of their
investigation of perceived threats to national security, Congress
enacted a transactional-immunity statute that applied to
congressional and grand-jury witnesses.4" In Ullman v. United States,41
the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction of a witness who
had been offered transactional immunity under the 1954 statute, but
refused to answer grand-jury questions regarding his membership in
the Communist Party.44 The Court rejected the witness's Fifth
Amendment45 and federalism46 arguments, but never discussed the
constitutionality of using the statute in a congressional investigation.
The 1954 law did not last long. Predictably, by the 1960s, the
specter of immunity baths began to resurface. 47 Prosecutors thought
that transactional immunity afforded witnesses too much protection
and asked Congress to pass a statute that would allow the prosecution
of witnesses who, under a grant of immunity, admitted to crimes.48
No alternative, however, appeared to exist. The Counselman Court's
statement that immunity statutes "must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates"49 suggested that only transactional immunity would satisfy
the Fifth Amendment. Congress seemed to be left with two
unpalatable alternatives-no immunity or immunity baths.50
and accompanying text.
42. See Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. at 745 (stating that no "witness
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he is so compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence"); Ronald F. Wright,
Congressional Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-Contra, 80 MINN. L. REv. 407, 416
(1995).
43. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
44. See id& at 439.
45. The witness argued that transactional immunity provided him with insufficient
protection because it left him exposed to a bevy of non-criminal sanctions, including "loss
of job, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, [loss of]
passport eligibility, and general public opprobrium." Id at 430. The Court held that" 'the
Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself-in other
words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge.' "Id at 431
(quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,67 (1906)).
46. The statute provided immunity from prosecution in state courts as well as federal
courts. See id at 434-35. The witness contended that Congress had no power to grant
immunity from state prosecution and that the statute, therefore, unconstitutionally
exposed him to criminal prosecution. See id. The Court held that it was within Congress's
power to immunize a witness from state prosecution. See id. at 436-37.
47. See Strachan, supra note 1, at 801.
48. See id.
49. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,586 (1892).
50. Professor Strachan, an advocate of transactional immunity, argues that witnesses
who receive transactional immunity are not always able to take "immunity baths" because
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Murphy v. Waterfront Commission5 created a third option. At
issue in Murphy was the extent to which a state grant of immunity
protected a witness from federal prosecution. The Court held that
the federal government could prosecute the witness for crimes related
to his testimony as long as "the compelled testimony and its fruits
cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with
criminal prosecution against him."52 This standard, known as "use
and derivative-use immunity,"53 is less protective than transactional
immunity, which forbids prosecutions for crimes related to any
information contained in immunized testimony. It is, however, more
protective than the unconstitutional simple use immunity, which
prohibits prosecutors from presenting immunized testimony at a
witness's trial, but allows them to use fruits of the testimony, such as
investigatory leads.-4
Six years after the Court decided Murphy, Congress passed the
modem immunity law, which applies to witnesses before agencies,
juries, grand juries, and congressional committees and provides for
use and derivative-use immunity.55 Congress hoped that this new
statute would be an effective compromise that would survive Fifth
Amendment scrutiny without imperiling prosecutions.56
they are immunized only "for answers responsive to proper questions" and for crimes
substantially related to their testimony. Strachan, supra note 1, at 803 n.48.
However, Professor Strachan does not deny that a witness who receives
transactional immunity is able to escape prosecution for any crimes substantially related to
his responsive testimony, no matter how much independently obtained evidence a
prosecutor can accumulate. For example, a murderer who testifies about events relating
to her crime under a grant of transactional immunity cannot be prosecuted even if the
police, who were never exposed to the immunized testimony, independently discover a
videotape of the murderer committing her crime.
51. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
52. 1d. at 79. In United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), the Court questioned
some of the reasoning in Murphy, but, nevertheless, affirmed Murphy's holding. See id. at
680-88.
53. Strachan, supra note 1, at 802; R.S. Ghio, Note, The Iran-Contra Prosecutions and
the Failure of Use Immunity, 45 STAN. L. REV. 229,239 (1992).
54. For example, suppose that a witness testified that he had stored five kilograms of
cocaine in his basement. If he had testified under a grant of simple use immunity, the
government would be able to retrieve the cocaine and use it as evidence against the
witness in a criminal trial. If, on the other hand, the witness had received use and
derivative-use immunity, the government would not be able to use the drugs against the
witness without first showing that the government's recovery of the drugs was "derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
55. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6002,6005 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999).
56. See Strachan, supra note 1, at 803.
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B. The Modem Immunity Statute in Operation: The Re-emergence of
Immunity Baths
In the context of congressional investigations, Congress's hopes
have been dashed. Although the 1970 statute does not violate the
Fifth Amendment, 7 convicting an immunized witness who testifies in
a public congressional hearing is nearly impossible.
The statute creates a number of procedural requirements that
must be met before a witness is immunized. The immunity process
begins when the House, Senate, or a congressional committee notifies
the Attorney General of its intention to seek an immunity order 8
This notice requirement is designed to provide "the Department of
Justice with 'time to lobby for a change of mind' on the part of [a]
congressional committee should the Attorney General object to the
grant of immunity" and to give the Attorney General "'an
opportunity to insulate from the immunity grant any incriminating
data already in his files prior to the witness' testimony.' "59 Ten days
after the Attorney General receives notice, the House, Senate, or
congressional committee may submit a request for immunity to a
federal district court.6 The request must be approved by "two-thirds
of the members of [a] full committee '61 or by "a majority vote of the
Members present" in the House or Senate.62 The Attorney General
then may ask the court for an additional twenty days to review the
57. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
58. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005(b)(3).
59. In re Application of United States Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
655 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting 2 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1406 (1970)). The Attorney General has the option
of waiving the statute's notice requirement. See id.
60. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005(b)(3).
61. I. § 6005(b)(2). The requirement of a two-thirds vote by full committees
originated in the 1954 immunity statute. See Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745
(1954). Congress created this requirement "because some members were concerned about
single-member subcommittees (consisting of individual Senators or Representatives)
holding hearings to expose Communists in important American institutions. Congress as a
whole was unwilling to give immunity power to the individual members who were
responsible for these abusive proceedings." Wright, supra note 42, at 416 (citations
omitted).
The two-thirds requirement gives members of the minority party the power to
block a committee from granting immunity. For example, in the Senate Banking
Committee's investigation of Whitewater, Democrats blocked the Republicans' effort to
immunize David Hale, a subsequently convicted Arkansas judge who was thought to have
possessed important information about then-Governor Clinton's financial dealings. See
Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of
Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REv. 631, 688 n.271 (1997).
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005(b)(1).
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immunity application.63
The court plays a largely "ministerial" role in granting the
congressional request for immunity.' It has no power to assess the
wisdom of an immunity application.' The court must issue an
immunity order as long as the statute's procedural requirements are
met,6 the testimony sought is relevant to an investigation that a
congressional committee has the authority to undertake, 67 the
testimony is not protected by the First Amendment,' and the
immunity statute is not being applied in an unconstitutional manner.69
An immunity order compels testimony by a subpoenaed witness who
had previously invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege." The statute
guarantees that "no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order."
71
The Attorney General72 has "no veto power" in this process. 73
The House, Senate, or a congressional committee can obtain an
immunity order regardless of any objection that the Attorney
General may have. In fact, the committees investigating Watergate
and the Iran-Contra affair ignored the objections of Special
63. See id § 6005(c).
64. In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361
F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (D.D.C. 1973).
65. See id, at 1278.
66. See id. at 1275-76.
67. See id. at 1278-79.
68. See id, at 1279. The First Amendment limits the power of the government to
subpoena the membership and contribution lists of organizations. See Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (forbidding the Florida
Legislature, on First Amendment grounds, from subpoenaing the membership and
contribution lists of the Miami Branch of the NAACP because Florida had failed to show
"a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest"). See generally GRABOW, supra note 23, at 133-36 (discussing
the First Amendment limitations on Congress's power to investigate).
69. See United States Senate Select Comm, 361 F. Supp. at 1279.
70. See 18 U.S.C.A § 6002 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999) ("[T]he witness may not refuse
to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.").
71. It
72. The recently expired independent-counsel statute gave counsels the authority to
make "applications to any Federal court for a grant of immunity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(a)(7)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (expired June 30, 1999). For simplicity's sake, I have used "the
Attorney General" as shorthand for "the Attorney General or an independent counsel"
when discussing the modem immunity statute.
73. United States Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1276. For a discussion of why
Congress did not grant the Attorney General a veto, see infra notes 308-10 and
accompanying text.
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Prosecutor Archibald Cox and Independent Counsel Lawrence
Walsh and took public immunized testimony from a number of
important ,witnesses.74
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of
immunizing a congressional witness under this or any previous law. 5
In Kastigar v. United States,76 the Court did reject a Fifth Amendment
challenge to the application of the modem immunity statute to grand-
jury witnesses. It stated that "a grant of immunity must afford
protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege; it need
not be broader. '77  The Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in
Counselman that simple use immunity statutes are unconstitutional,78
but held that the 1970 statute's use and derivative-use immunity "is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination,
and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
privilege. '79 The Kastigar Court observed that the statute "prohibits
the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in
any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness."8  The Court
rejected the argument that use and derivative-use immunity does not
prevent the prosecutor from obtaining "leads, names of witnesses, or
other information not otherwise available that might result in a
74. Senator Sam Ervin's Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
immunized 28 witnesses, see Wright, supra note 42, at 431, including important figures
such as John Dean and Jeb Stuart Magruder. See George W. Van Cleve & Charles W.
Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in
Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 MO. L. REV. 43,
53 (1990). Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox objected to these grants of immunity
because Congress would not take steps to limit public exposure to the witnesses'
testimony. See United States Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1272, 1279-80. The
House and Senate committees investigating Iran-Contra immunized 26 witnesses, see
Wright, supra note 42, at 431, most notably Oliver North and John Poindexter. See infra
notes 91-99 and accompanying text. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh opposed all
grants of immunity to witnesses then under criminal investigation. See Van Cleve &
Tiefer, supra, at 55; Gilbert, supra note 33, at 423.
75. Cf. Uliman v. United States 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956) (upholding a grant of
immunity to a grand-jury witness); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (upholding a
grant of immunity to a witness who testified before the Interstate Commerce
Commission); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) (reversing the contempt
conviction of a grand-jury witness).
76. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
77. Id, at 453.
78. See id at 453-54 ("The Counselman statute, as construed by the Court, was
plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence
derived from his compelled testimony.").
79. Id at 453.
80. Id
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prosecution."'" The statute's "total:prohibition on. use provides a
comprehensive safeguard, barring the use of compelled testimony as
an 'investigatory lead,' and also barring the use of, any evidence
obtained by focusing [an] investigation on a witness as a result of his
compelled disclosures."'  To ensure that this safeguard is effective, if
an immunized witness is tried for a crime related to his testimony, the
prosecution has "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony."83 In spite of the statute's
broad protection, the Court confidently asserted that "[t]he statute,
like the Fifth Amendment, grants neither pardon nor amnesty. Both
the statute and the Fifth Amendment allow the government to
prosecute using evidence from legitimate independent sources."'
Prosecutors have been successful in convicting defendants who
previously provided immunized grand-jury testimonyY To prove that
no evidence at trial, including testimony by prosecution witnesses, is
derived from immunized testimony, prosecutors keep "careful
records of the independent source leading to each witness, and to
each planned line of questioning on direct and cross-examination
[and] 'can' the testimony-that is, record the witness's testimony
before the defendant receives immunity to testify." 6 Prosecutors also
present proof that neither they nor other officials participating in a
81. Id. at 459.
82. Id. at 460.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 461. Kastigar left a number of questions unanswered. For example,
although Kastigar clearly states that prosecutors may not use immunized testimony to
"focus[] [their] investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosure" or as an
"investigatory lead," id. at 460, lower courts disagree about whether a prosecutor may use
immunized testimony for non-evidentiary purposes, such as "'deciding to initiate
prosecution, refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination,
and otherwise generally planning trial strategy.'" United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 16
(1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973)).
Compare United States v. Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1994) (prohibiting
non-evidentiary uses of immunized testimony), United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716,
721-22 (3d Cir. 1980) (same), and McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311 (same), with United States v.
Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992) (permitting non-evidentiary uses), United
States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), and Serrano, 870 F.2d at 17
(rejecting the "notion that all nonevidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth
Amendment," but declining to decide whether "certain nonevidentiary uses ... may so
prejudice the defendant as to warrant dismissal of the indictment"). For a discussion of
other issues Kastigar failed to settle, see Wright, supra note 42, at 419-23.
85. See, e.g., United States v. France, 164 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
86. Wright, supra note 42, at 422.
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trial have been exposed to immunized grand-jury testimony.' The
government's ability to insulate members of the prosecution team
from immunized testimony is facilitated by the secrecy of grand-jury
proceedings.' If the government takes proper precautions, the only
people who need be exposed to immunized grand-jury testimony are
the grand jurors, the witness, a prosecutor, and the court reporter.
The government can then erect a "fire wall" to ensure that these
tainted individuals play no part in any subsequent prosecution of the
grand-jury witness. 89
A prosecutor seeking to convict an immunized congressional
witness faces a much more difficult task. Generally, the testimony of
such a witness is public and receives a substantial amount of media
coverageY0 Insulating the prosecution team from this testimony is a
Herculean task. The Iran-Contra prosecutions of Admiral John
Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North illustrate these
difficulties. 9' The Independent Counsel went so far as to order
prosecutors to read only redacted newspapers and to avoid exposure
to any television or radio broadcast that was potentially related to the
immunized testimony.'
87. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' MANUAL 9-23.400
(1997) (Sup. Docs. No. J1.8:AT 84/2/997).
88. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (requiring, with few exceptions, that matters occurring
before the grand jury be kept secret).
89. See United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22,26 (2d Cir. 1989).
90. See Wright, supra note 42, at 428. Congressional committees can, and sometimes
do, meet in executive session. See Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information:
Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 816 (1985). If an
immunized witness testifies in closed session, it is easier to insulate the testimony and
subsequently prosecute the witness. As Part V explains, keeping immunized congressional
testimony secret would minimize the constitutional problems created by a congressional
grant of immunity. See infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text. One of the reasons for
launching a congressional investigation, however, is to inform the public about the
misconduct of public officials or about the need for legislation. Congressional
investigations are, therefore, almost always conducted in open session. See infra notes
298-303 and accompanying text.
91. The Watergate prosecutions do not provide as clear an illustration. Although the
Ervin Committee immunized 28 witnesses in its investigation of Watergate, see supra note
74, prosecutors were not forced to test whether it is possible to convict a witness who has
provided immunized congressional testimony. All but one of the 28 who were indicted
pleaded guilty. See Strachan, supra note 1, at 814. As Professor Strachan explains,
prosecutors moved to dismiss the charges against her husband, Gordon Strachan, the one
immunized witness who did not plead guilty, because "[w]ide dissemination of his
compelled testimony by national television, radio, and other news media cast the problem
of prohibited use of immunized testimony in a uniquely aggravated posture." Id. at 819.
92. See United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). To protect the Independent Counsel and his
associate counsel from exposure to immunized testimony,
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The Independent Counsel succeeded in convicting Poindexter
and North 3 While the Poindexter and North appeals were pending,
two commentators observed that the Independent Counsel had
"taken most, if not all, of the precautions which could reasonably
have been taken to protect against taint. If [these] actions do not
meet the Kastigar requirements, Congress should probably conclude
that its grants of immunity in major investigations will likely preclude
subsequent prosecution of immunized individuals."94
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
reversed the North and Poindexter convictions.95 The North 11 court
held that the Kastigar standard is not met merely by showing that the
prosecution insulated itself from immunized testimony.96 Kastigar "is
instead violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness whose
testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony,
regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled
testimony."97  In North I, the Independent Counsel had failed to
prove that former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane had
not used North's testimony to refresh his recollection of events.9 In
Poindexter, the principal tainted witness was none other than Oliver
North, who had been exposed to Poindexter's congressional
testimony.99 Together, these cases establish that a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights are. violated if a grand-jury or trial witness's
[p]rosecuting personnel were sealed off from exposure to the immunized
testimony itself and publicity concerning it. Daily newspaper clippings and
transcripts of testimony before the Select Committees were redacted by non-
prosecuting "tainted" personnel to avoid direct and explicit references to
immunized testimony. Prosecutors, and those immediately associated with them,
were confined to reading these redacted materials. In addition, they were
instructed to shut off television or radio broadcasts that even approached
discussion of the immunized testimony.... In order to monitor the matter, all
inadvertent exposures were to be reported for review of their possible
significance.
See id. The Iran-Contra Committees also tried to accommodate the Independent Counsel
by postponing Oliver North's testimony to give prosecutors enough time to "can" their
evidence against North. See Ghio, supra note 53, at 247.
93. See Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 371; United States v. North ("North I"), 910 F.2d 843,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), modified by United States v. North ("North II"), 920
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
94. Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 74, at 53 n.40 (internal citations omitted). George
Van Cleve and Charles Tiefer served, respectively, as Chief Minority Counsel and Special
Deputy Chief Counsel on the House's Iran-Contra Committee. See id. at 43 nn.*, **.
95. See Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 371; North 11, 920 F.2d at 942.
96. North 11, 920 F.2d at 942.
97. Id.
98. North I, 910 F.2d at 864.
99. See Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 373-77.
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recollection is refreshed by immunized testimony.
When the government seeks to prosecute someone who has
provided immunized grand-jury testimony, it can prove that potential
trial testimony has not been tainted by "canning" that testimony.100
When it comes to prosecuting immunized congressional witnesses,
however, canning is ineffective for several reasons.1 1 For one thing,
criminal investigations and prosecutions often move much more
slowly than congressional inquiries. When a committee grantsimmunity, a prosecutor may not yet have identified key trial
witnesses. 1 2 Even if witnesses are identified, prosecutors will have a
difficult time canning testimony because prosecutors will not yet have
full knowledge of the facts.l" More fundamentally, North H's holding
that a witness is tainted "regardless of how or by whom he was
exposed to ... compelled testimony"' 4 requires prosecutors to ensure
that witnesses do not watch the testimony on television, read about it
in a newspaper, or hear about it from a friend. Prosecutors are not
equipped to meet this burden. Even if immunized testimony is not
broadcast on television, prospective witnesses will likely know about
the defendant's testimony and understandably will be curious to learn
about it. Also, a witness friendly with a defendant could try to thwart
a prosecution by deliberately exposing herself to immunized
testimony, and prosecutors would be powerless to stop her. 05
During the Iran-Contra hearings, Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh unsuccessfully tried to overcome these difficulties.
Although many prospective trial witnesses testified before the grand
jury or were interviewed by the FBI prior to North's and Poindexter's
congressional appearances, the Independent Counsel was unable to
can the testimony of other witnesses.106 Walsh also asked witnesses to
100. For a description of "canning," see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
101. See North II, 920 F.2d at 951-52 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part); Miller, supra note
61, at 688; Wright, supra note 42, at 426.
102. See Wright, supra note 42, at 426.
103. See North 11, 920 F.2d at 952 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part).
104. Idl at 942.
105. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 1050. In theory, a prosecutor could bring
obstruction-of-justice charges against a witness who intentionally watched or read about
immunized testimony. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West 1984 & Supp. 1999) (declaring that
obstruction of justice occurs when someone "corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or
impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration of
justice"). As Professor Wright explains, however, "it would be most difficult for a
prosecutor to prove that the defendant witness exposed himself or herself to the testimony
with the purpose of obstructing the criminal proceedings. Most witnesses will have many
legitimate reasons, including the curiosity shared by most citizens, for listening to the
congressional testimony." Wright, supra note 42, at 427.
106. See Wright, supra note 42, at 425.
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insulate themselves from immunized testimony, but most refused.1°7
In short, as former Whitewater Special Counsel Robert Fiske0 8 and a
number of others'0 9 have concluded, the Iran-Contra prosecutions
show that an attempt to convict someone who provides public
immunized testimony to a congressional committee almost certainly
will fail. 10
Unfortunately, this problem has no easy solution. Changing the
immunity standard is not an option. The Kastigar-North-Poindexter
requirements are based on the Fifth Amendment, and Kastigar made
it quite clear that moving to a more relaxed immunity standard, such
as simple use immunity, would be unconstitutional."' A
congressional committee could hear immunized testimony in
107. See id.
108. See John van Loben Sels, Note, From Watergate to Whitewater: Congressional Use
Immunity and Its Impact on the Independent Counsel, 83 GEO. L.J. 2385, 2394 (1995)
(recounting an interview with Special Counsel Fiske). The author goes on to argue that,
whenever possible, Congress should postpone immunity grants until after the prosecution
has had time to pursue its investigation. See id at 2403-05.
109. See, e.g., North 11, 920 F.2d at 951-52 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part); Miller, supra
note 61, at 688; Wright, supra note 42, at 426.
110. Congress has become increasingly aware of this fact and, since the North and
Poindexter decisions, has become much more cautious in granting immunity. For
example, in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's recent campaign-finance
investigation, the Committee refused to immunize John Huang, who was a central figure
in its investigation. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION
OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER AcTIVTES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS, S. REP. NO. 105-167, at 4841 (1998) (Sup. Docs. No. Yl.1/5:105-1671V.4)
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REPORT]; see also Wright, supra note 42, at 431-33
(surveying anecdotal and statistical evidence of Congress's increasing reluctance to grant
immunity). The Governmental Affairs Committee did, however, immunize nine other
witnesses. See CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REPORT, supra, at 17. In a separate campaign-
finance investigation, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
immunized seven witnesses. See Howard Kurtz, No-Camera Option Under House GOP
Fire, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1997, at A18; George Lardner, Jr., House Panel Closes Ranks;
Money Probe Immunizes Four, WASH. POST, June 24, 1998, at A2.
111. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1972). Professor Akhil Amar
argues that the Supreme Court should overrule Kastigar and hold that the Fifth
Amendment requires only simple use immunity. See AKIHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-82 (1997). But see Donald Dripps,
Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That
Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1623-35 (1996) (criticizing Professor Amar's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment); Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 954-80
(1995) (same). The Supreme Court has shown no signs of adopting Professor Amar's
suggestion. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 692 (1998) (noting that if the
government "is ready to provide the requisite use and derivative use immunity... no claim
of [Fifth Amendment] privilege will avail" (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84
(1973); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453) (emphasis added)).
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executive session 12 or postpone hearing immunized testimony until
after the prosecution has had time to pursue its investigation,"3
thereby minimizing the chance that prospective grand-jury and trial
witnesses would be tainted. But, as Part V explains, a congressional
committee often will consider bringing the guilty individual to justice
less important than holding a public hearing that promptly informs
citizens about corruption in government or about the need for new
legislation.
Although transactional immunity is no longer the law, the 1970
statute nonetheless allows a congressional committee to place a
witness in an immunity bath. Because the court exercises only a
"ministerial" duty in granting congressional immunity requests,114 and
because the Attorney General or an independent counsel is powerless
to intervene, Congress possesses unfettered power to immunize
witnesses. The statute's creation of this unilateral congressional
power to derail a prosecution raises serious constitutional questions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY CONGRESSIONAL
GRANTS OF IMMUNITY
A. Two Critical Questions
The debate over the constitutionality of immunity statutes has
centered almost exclusively on the Fifth Amendment. In
Counselman, Ullman, and Kastigar, witnesses claimed that particular
immunity statutes violated the Fifth Amendment by permitting the
government to use their testimony against them. In each of these
cases, the Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment did not
prohibit the government from compelling testimony as long as the
witness received adequate immunity."5 As the Court explained more
recently, "[t]he practice of exchanging silence for immunity is ...
presumably invulnerable" from Fifth Amendment attack.1 6
The Fifth Amendment is not, however, the only constitutional
ground on which an immunity statute may be challenged. Like any
other federal law, an immunity statute not only must comply with the
Bill of Rights, but also must be consistent with separation of
112. See Wright, supra note 42, at 449.
113. See van Loben Sels, supra note 108, at 2403-05.
114. In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361
F. Supp. 1270,1272 (D.D.C. 1973).
115. See supra notes 37-40,43-46,76-84 and accompanying text.
116. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692 n.13.
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powers."7
As with any constitutional question, the place to begin examining
the separation-of-powers constraints on. congressional grants of
immunity is the text of the Constitution. The word "immunity" does
not appear in the Constitution. The only constitutional provision that
explicitly grants a government actor the authority to release someone
from criminal liability is the Pardons Clause, which gives the
President the "[p]ower to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.""'
Indeed, one could argue that because the Pardons Clause does not
mention Congress, the power to prevent someone from being
punished belongs exclusively to the President."' Under this line of
reasoning, a congressional grant of immunity would encroach on the
President's authority.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in the only case in
which it has considered whether an immunity statute transgressed the
separation of powers. In Brown v. Walker,20 the Supreme Court
upheld an 1893 statute that authorized the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) to grant witnesses transactional immunity. The
Court characterized "[t]he act of Congress in question securing to
witnesses immunity from prosecution [as] virtually an act of general
amnesty."'' The Brown Court held that, although the President
possesses the power to pardon, Congress has a concurrent power "to
pass acts of general amnesty" and that this authority " 'extends to
every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time
after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or
117. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that liberty is protected not only by the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment but also by the "principles of separation of powers and
federalism").
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted this presidential
power quite broadly. For example, a pardon may be conditional or absolute, see Schick v.
Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 314-15 (1856), and
"cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress," Schick, 419 U.S. at 26.
See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch. Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 265 (1994) (noting that "it has become well-settled
that the President has essentially unbridled discretion" in the use of the pardon power).
The President may pardon just one person or confer amnesty to a whole class of
individuals. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,147-48 (1871).
119. See William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 521-24 (1977) (outlining the case for an exclusive
presidential power to pardon).
120. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
121. I at 601 (citation omitted).
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during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.' ,2 The
Court then concluded that Congress could delegate the power to
grant amnesty or immunity to the ICC.'2 The Brown Court relied
heavily on The Laura," an 1885 case in which the Court had held
that Congress had the authority to delegate to the Secretary of the
Treasury the power to "remit or mitigate any fine or penalty provided
for in laws relating to steam vessels, or discontinue any prosecution to
recover penalties denounced in such laws, excepting the penalty of
imprisonment, or of removal from office."'2
Although Brown put to rest the argument that the Pardons
Clause prevents Congress or a part of Congress from immunizing a
witness, the case raises two critical questions.
The law upheld in Brown, as well as the statutes, or portions of
statutes, upheld in Ullman and Kastigar,z6 did not give Congress or a
part of Congress the discretion to immunize a witness. Instead, the
statute in Brown gave that power to the ICC, an independent
administrative agency. Thus, the first critical question raised by
Brown is: if Congress may delegate immunity-granting power to a
non-congressional body like the ICC, may it also delegate this power
to itself?
Unfortunately, Brown v. Walker, which predates modem
separation-of-powers jurisprudence, provides no guidance in
determining whether Congress can delegate the power to immunize
to itself or to a unit within Congress. Brown simply cites The Laura,
whose holding that Congress could delegate amnesty power to the
122. Id (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867)). The Court also
explained that the "distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical
importance .... '[T]he Constitution does not use the word "amnesty," and, except that the
term is generally applied where pardon is extended to whole classes or communities ...
the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal
importance.'" Id (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877)). The Court
later elaborated on this distinction:
[T]here are incidental differences of importance [between amnesty and pardon].
They are of different character and have different purposes. The one overlooks
offense; the other remits punishment. The first is usually addressed to crimes
against the sovereignty of the State, to political offenses, forgiveness being
deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment.
The second condones infractions of the peace of the State.
Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1915).
123. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 601.
124. 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
125. Id at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Ullman and Kastigar, cases which upheld statutes providing immunity to grand-
jury witnesses, dealt only with Fifth Amendment and federalism challenges to these laws.
See supra notes 43-46, 76-84 and accompanying text.
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Secretary of the Treasury is based solely on the fact that the
Secretary's exercise of this power had been "observed and acquiesced
in for nearly a century." 12 7 Neither Brown nor The Laura provides
any guidance as to whether Congress can give itself the power to
grant immunity.
The second unanswered question involves Congress's power to
pass general amnesty laws. An act of general amnesty is a statute that
pardons " 'whole classes or communities.' "12 Like all other statutes,
amnesty acts must be passed by both Houses of Congress and
presented for signature to the President.29 In contrast, under the
modem immunity statute, one House of Congress or a congressional
committee has the unilateral power to choose whom to immunize. If,
as Brown held, immunizing a witness is analogous to "an act of
general amnesty,"' 30 and if Congress may pass an amnesty statute that
both the House and Senate have agreed to and have presented for
signature to the President, may one House of Congress or a
congressional committee unilaterally decide whom to immunize?
B. The Executive Power-Legislative Power Box
The Supreme Court's modem separation-of-powers cases
establish two interrelated principles relevant to the two questions
raised by Brown v. Walker. First, although Congress may determine
which executive agency or independent agency has the authority to
decide how a law is to be executed, 3' Congress may not delegate to
itself any role in executing a law.32 Second, the only constitutional
127. The Laura, 114 U.S. at 414. The appellant had asserted that the President's
authority to pardon "is in its nature exclusive; and that its exercise, in whatever form, by
any subordinate officer of the government, is an encroachment upon the constitutional
prerogatives of the President." Id at 413. The Court's exclusive reliance on historical
practice to reject this argument has caused at least one commentator to describe The
Laura as "not well reasoned." Duker, supra note 119, at 524.
128. Brown, 161 U.S. at 601 (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877)).
129. See infra notes 133, 157-62 and accompanying text.
130. Brown, 161 U.S. at 601 (citation omitted).
131. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 769-74 (1996) (upholding
Congress's delegation to the President of the power to define aggravating factors in a
military court-martial); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding a
statute giving the United States Sentencing Commission the power to adopt federal
sentencing guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 662-63, 693-96 (1988) (upholding
a statute that gives an independent counsel the power to enforce criminal law); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642-43 (1980)
(interpreting a statute that gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to set workplace
safety standards for toxic substances).
132. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718 (1985) (striking down the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act); infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
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way for Congress to exercise legislative power is to pass a statute
approved by both Houses of Congress and then to present it for
signature to the President.133 Thus, if granting immunity is an exercise
of executive power, Congress may vest that power in the ICC, the
Attorney General, or an independent counsel, but it may not assign
the power to the House, the Senate, or a committee. If immunizing a
witness is an exercise of legislative power, then Congress may pass a
statute granting immunity to a particular witness, but neither a House
of Congress nor a committee can choose, on its own, whom to
immunize.
The roots of these two principles and the answers to the
questions raised by Brown lie in the Constitution's rejection of a
parliamentary form of government in which legislative and executive
power are intermingled." 4 The Framers of the Constitution warned
that combining executive and legislative power in one entity would
lead to tyranny. 35 Montesquieu, on whose writings James Madison
relied, explained that "[w]hen the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person ... there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 136
Heeding Montesquieu's admonition, the Supreme Court has
invalidated statutes that give Congress a role in executing the law.
For example, in Bowsher v. Synar,3 7 the Court struck down the
133. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become[s] a Law, be presented to the
President .... "); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (holding that Congress may not "invest itself
or its Members with either executive power or judicial power" and that "when it exercises
legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures specified in Article I" (citations omitted)); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (holding that Congress may not "invest itself or its
members with either executive power or judicial power").
134. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(criticizing the British form of government in which "[t]he executive magistrate forms an
integral part of the legislative authority"); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1221, 1238 (1995) (discussing "the parliamentary form of government that the
Framers repudiated").
135. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 272-74 (discussing the
Framers' opposition to concentrating legislative and executive power in one body);
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382 (explaining that "the Framers recognized the particular danger
of the Legislative Branch's accreting to itself judicial or executive power").
136. 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWs 185 (photo. reprint 1984) (1751); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 134,
at 302-03 (quoting Montesquieu).
137. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,13 which provided that across-the-
board cuts in federal spending would occur if the federal budget
deficit exceeded specified levels. 39 The statute gave the Comptroller
General, an officer who is removable by Congress, 4 ° the "ultimate
authority" to decide the exact magnitude of these cuts.'4' The Court,
drawing on Madison and Montesquieu,'42 held that the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act was unconstitutional because it granted
executive power to an official who was under congressional control:
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms,
reserve in Congress control over the execution of the
laws.... The structure of the Constitution does not permit
Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress
cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not
possess. 143
Two years later, the Court reaffirmed and distinguished
Bowsher. In Morrison v. Olson,'" the Court upheld the independent-
counsel statute.145 One ground on which the statute was challenged
was that its limitation of the Attorney General's "power to remove
the independent counsel to only those instances in which [the
Attorney General] can show 'good cause'... impermissibly interferes
with the President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed
functions."' 4 The Morrison Court held that restrictions on the
President's authority to remove an official are constitutional as long
as they do not "impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty."'147 Although Congress enjoys broad authority to
138. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
139. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 718.
140. See id. at 727-28.
141. Id. at 733.
142. See id. at 721 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 134, at 302 (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 135, at 185)).
143. Id at 726.
144. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
145. See id. at 697. The independent-counsel statute was codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-
599 (Supp. V 1987) (expired 1992). In 1994, Congress reauthorized the independent-
counsel statute in amended form. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994). The latter statute
expired on June 30,1999. See id. § 599.
146. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)).
147. Id. at 691. The landmark case establishing Congress's power to limit the
President's removal authority is Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935). In Humphrey's Executor, the Court held that with respect to "quasi-legislative"
and "quasi-judicial" agencies, id. at 627-28, the "authority of Congress, in creating [such]
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive
control ... includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they
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limit the President's removal power, the Court quoted Bowsher and
explained that " 'Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment.' "14 As the Court noted, the Constitution "prevents
Congress from 'draw[ing] to itself ... the power to remove or the
right to participate in the exercise of that power.' ""'9 The
independent-counsel statute did not suffer from this constitutional
infirmity because it did "not involve an attempt by Congress itself to
gain a role in the removal of executive officials other than its
established powers of impeachment and conviction.' ' 50
The Court further delineated the separation of legislative and
executive power in Buckley v. Valeo.'5 ' In Buckley, the Court
considered the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,52 which created the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the statute by promulgating
rules and bringing civil actions to punish violators.53 Under this
legislation, four of the six FEC commissioners were to be appointed
by the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate.Y In Buckley, the Court held that this delegation of power
violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 5  The Court
shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime," id.
at 629. The appellants in Morrison argued that Humphrey's Executor rested "on a
distinction between 'purely executive' officials and officials who exercise 'quasi-legislative'
and 'quasi-judicial' powers. In their view,... the President must have absolute discretion
to discharge 'purely' executive officials at will." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688. The Court
disagreed with this characterization of Humphrey's Executor, observing that its "removal
cases [are] designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be
removed at will by the President." Id. at 689. Morrison concluded that removal
restrictions are constitutional if they do not interfere with the President's ability to
accomplish his presidential role. See id. at 690. For powerful criticism of the Court's
reasoning, see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105,
113-17 (1988).
148. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-86 (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726).
149. Id. at 686 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926)).
150. Id The Court's reasoning dictates that "the outcome of [the] case would have
been dramatically different had [Olson] been investigated by a prosecutor under
congressional control rather than one who was independent under the terms of the Ethics
in Government Act." Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for
Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563,591 (1991).
151. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
152. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A.
§§ 431-455 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999)).
153. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137 (describing the FEC's functions).
154. See iL at 126.
155. The Appointments Clause provides that:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of
[Vol. 78
1999] CONGRESSIONAL GRANTS OF IMMUNITY 177
explained that Congress had no power to " 'enforce [laws] or appoint
the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement.' "156
As Bowsher, Morrison, and Buckley demonstrate, the Court has
strictly prohibited Congress from playing any role in executing the
law. The Constitution has placed another restriction on Congress-
the only way Congress may exercise legislative power is to pass a
statute approved by both Houses of Congress and to present it for
signature to the President. 57
The leading case setting forth the latter principle is INS v.
Chadha5 8 At issue in Chadha was a statute that gave the Attorney
General the power to suspend deportation of an alien, but permitted
either House of Congress to override the Attorney General's decision
through a legislative veto. 59 The Attorney General exercised his
power to suspend Chadha's deportation, but the House vetoed this
decision.'" The Court held that such a veto is an exercise of
legislative power 6' and that the House's action in the case was
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with "the Constitution's
prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President." 62
With the help of these precedents, we are now ready to answer
preliminarily the questions posed by Brown v. Walker. Under Brown,
Congress can delegate to a non-congressional body like the ICC the
power to grant immunity.63 If, however, immunizing a witness gives
Congress or some part of Congress a role in executing the law,
congressional immunity grants would be unconstitutional under
Bowsher, Morrison, and Buckley 64 As to the second question posed
by Brown, the Brown Court held that Congress has the power to pass
a statute conferring amnesty on classes of people. 65 If, however,
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
156. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139 (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202
(1928)).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
158. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
159. Id. at 924-25 (describing the statutory framework).
160. See il at 924-27.
161. See id. at 952.
162. Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
163. 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
164. See supra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
165. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 602.
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granting immunity is a legislative act, then under Chadha, one House
of Congress or a committee could not choose whom to immunize. 6
Each immunity grant would have to be the product of the same
process used to pass amnesty statutes-it would have to be approved
by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President for
signature.
Unfortunately, the Court's definitions of executive and
legislative acts are imprecise and overlapping. In Chadha, the Court
held that the House's veto was an exercise of legislative power
because it "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General,
Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative
Branch."1 67 While the veto was an exercise of legislative power, the
Attorney General's decision to suspend Chadha's deportation was
"executive action" that only "resemble[d] 'legislative' action in some
respects [and was] not subject to the approval of both Houses of
Congress and the President."'" The Court tried to distinguish
legislative from executive power by explaining that "[e]xecutive
action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that
authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial
review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the
authority entirely.' 16 9
The Court's distinction between legislative and executive power
is unpersuasive. As Professor Strauss has explained, the Attorney
General's "executive action" altered legal rights no less than did the
House's "legislative action":
However one might label what the Department of Justice
and the House did in considering the cancellation of Mr.
Chadha's deportation for compassionate reasons, the action
of each seems to have been of the same nature and to have
had precisely the same kind of legal effect on Mr. Chadha's
rights. Depending on the characterization employed, one
could say either that the Department effected a suspension
of an individual deportation order which the House
canceled, or that, between the two, the conditions for
166. The constitutional problem would remain the same even if both Houses of
Congress voted to immunize a witness without submitting the action to the President for
signing. See United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216, 1216 (1983)
(summarily affirming a decision invalidating a bicameral legislative veto).
167. 462 U.S. at 952.
168. Id. at 953-54 n.16.
169. Id.
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cancellation of a deportation order were not met.170
As for the fact that the Attorney General's actions were authorized
by statute and subject to judicial review, the "House's action was also
authorized and limited by a statute, could occur only within its terms,
and no doubt was subject to judicial correction if these terms were
exceeded."''
Rather than focusing on legislative power, Bowsher and
Morrison focused on the definition of executive power. Bowsher held
that the Comptroller General exercised executive power because
"[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative
mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law. Under [the
statute,] the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning
facts that affect the application of the Act."'172 Morrison stated that
"[t]here is no real dispute that the functions performed by the
independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by
officials within the Executive Branch."'73
Imprecise though they are, the Court's definitions of legislative
and executive power appear to place congressional grants of
immunity in jeopardy. When a committee hears public immunized
170. Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme
Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J 789, 797; see also E. Donald Elliott, INS
v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto,
1983 SuP. Cr. REV. 125, 134-38 (criticizing the Court's definition of legislative power);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9 (1984) (noting that "nearly all exercises of delegated authority...
alter legal rights, duties, and relations, thereby changing the legal status of persons outside
the legislative branch in ways that, without the challenged delegation, could have been
achieved, if at all, only by legislation").
171. Strauss, supra note 170, at 799.
172. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,733 (1985).
173. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 832 (1985) ("[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict...
has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch."); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.").
Buckley's discussion of executive power is even less illuminating. The Court held
that the FEC's power to sue offenders is an executive function because "a lawsuit is the
ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress,
that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3). The FEC's authority to promulgate regulations, issue advisory opinions, and
determine the eligibility of candidates for federal funds are "more legislative and judicial
in nature than are the Commission's enforcement powers, and are of kinds usually
performed by independent regulatory agencies or by some department in the Executive
Branch under the direction of an Act of Congress." Id. at 140-41.
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testimony, it seems to meet the Chadha criterion for a legislative act.
Just as the House's veto altered Chadha's legal rights by subjecting
him to deportation, immunizing a witness alters her legal rights by
freeing her from prosecution. At the same time, however, a
congressional grant of immunity also seems to qualify as an executive
act because it is an exercise of "independent judgment concerning
facts that affect the application" of the immunity statute.174 Also, by
making future prosecutions impossible, grants of immunity play a
pivotal, destructive role in the executive function of law enforcement.
Congressional grants of immunity thus seem to violate either
Bowsher, Morrison, and Buckley on the one hand, or Chadha on the
other. The Court's diaphanous and overlapping definitions of
legislative and executive power make it difficult to choose. However,
this difficulty is neither surprising nor troubling because Chadha
stands for the same broad anti-parliamentary principle that the other
three cases do. Bowsher, Morrison, and Buckley make it clear that
Congress may not play any role in executing the law. When one
House of Congress legislatively Vetoes the way in which the executive
branch enforces a law, it plays a role in the execution or
implementation of that law.75 Chadha provides a good illustration.
Instead of deciding that the House's veto was an exercise of
legislative power, the Supreme Court could have reasoned that
enforcing the immigration law was an executive function and that the
House's veto was an attempt to control how the Attorney General
exercised this power.176
Thus, Chadha and Bowsher, Morrison, and Buckley provide two
complementary ways of analyzing the congressional power toimmunize. One may cite Buckley, Bowsher, and Morrison and
analyze an immunity grant as an attempt by a congressional
committee to play a role in the executive function of law
enforcement. Alternatively, one may cite Chadha and analyze this
power as a legislative veto over the Executive's authority to
prosecute. Either way, the result is the same-congressional grants of
immunity appear to be unconstitutional.'"
174. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733.
175. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983); Tribe, supra note 134, at 1238.
176. See Tribe, supra note 134, at 1238.
177. In Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991), the Supreme Court recognized that courts need not
choose whether a statute is unconstitutional under Chadha or under Buckley, Bowsher,
and Morrison. See id. at 276. The Court invalidated a statute giving Congress the power
to appoint members to a board that exercised veto power over the body that operates the
airports of Metropolitan Washington, D.C. See id. at 277. It declined to decide whether
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There is, however, one possible way of saving the congressional
power to immunize. Although the Constitution generally prohibits
legislative vetoes and congressional exercises of executive power, the
Constitution does authorize Congress or a part of Congress to act
unilaterally "to take some actions with effects outside the Legislative
Branch."'17 One such unilateral congressional power is the power to
investigate.17 9 Part III examines the scope of Congress's investigative
authority and considers whether it authorizes Congress, in the face of
Bowsher, Morrison, Buckley, and Chadha, to grant immunity to a
witness.
III. CONGRESS'S POWER TO INVESTIGATE
The Constitution does not specifically grant Congress any
investigative power. Nevertheless, since the 1790s, Congress has
regularly conducted investigations in which it has exercised subpoena
power and punished contumacious witnesses.' The Supreme Court
has broadly defined the subject matters that Congress has authority to
investigate and has recognized that Congress possesses subpoena and
contempt power to obtain the information it needs to conduct an
investigation.
Congress's broad power to investigate traces back to the British
Parliament, which had the unchecked power to issue subpoenas for
information related to any topic and to punish individuals for
contempt.'8' The House of Commons and House of Lords claimed
plenary power over policing breaches of parliamentary privilege.' z
Only Parliament "could declare what those privileges were or what
new privileges were occasioned, and only Parliament could judge
the board's power was executive or legislative and held that "[i]f the power is executive,
the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is
legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Art. I, § 7." Id. at 276.
178. Id. at 276 n.21. For example, the Constitution authorizes the House alone to
impeach the President, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and the Senate alone to convict the
President, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-38 (1976) (per curiam).
180. For brief summaries of the history of congressional investigations, see GRABOW,
supra note 23, §§ 2.2-.6, at 17-75, and James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 168-221 (1926). The most
detailed history of congressional investigations is the multi-volume CONGRESS
INvESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY (Arthur M. Schlesinger & Robert Bruns eds.,
1975).
181. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,188 (1957).
182. See ic at 188; see also C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 703-04 (1925) (discussing Parliament's authority to
punish for contempt).
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what conduct constituted a breach of privilege."' 3  Parliament
interpreted its privileges quite broadly and imposed draconian
punishments on private citizens who criticized it or the King.',,
Beginning in the seventeenth century, the House of Commons and
House of Lords began to use their contempt power to enforce
parliamentary subpoenas. 5 As William Pitt explained in 1742,
Parliament was "the Grand Inquest of the Nation, and [had a] duty to
inquire into every Step of public management, either Abroad or at
Home, in order to see that nothing [had] been done amiss. '186
Parliament had the power to "inquire into every thing which it
concerns the public weal for them to know; and they themselves
[were] entrusted with the determination of what falls within that
category."'1 7
Almost from its inception, Congress also has exercised
investigative power. At the Constitutional Convention, George
Mason declared that members of Congress "are not only Legislators
but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must meet frequently to
inspect the Conduct of the public offices. ''I" Congress first exercised
these "inquisitorial powers" in 1792, when a House committee issued
subpoenas in an investigation of a failed military operation 8 9
Although early uses of the subpoena power involved only inquiries
183. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 188.
184. See id. at 189. One of the more notorious examples involved a private individual
who was Catholic and who, in a private conversation, "expressed pleasure over the
misfortune of the King's Protestant son-in-law and his wife." Id. The House of Commons
imposed the following punishment:
Floyd, for uttering a few contemptible expressions, was degraded from his
gentility, and to be held an infamous person; his testimony not to be received; to
ride from the Fleet to Cheapside on horseback, without a saddle, with his face to
the horse's tail, and the tail in his hand, and then to stand two hours in the
pillory, and to be branded in the forehead with the letter K; to ride four days
afterwards in the same manner to Westminster, and then to stand two hours
more in the pillory, with words on a paper in his hat showing his offence; to be
whipped at the cart's tail from the Fleet to Westminster Hall; to pay a fine of
5000E; and to be a prisoner in Newgate during his life.
1 JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
348 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1838). The House of Commons vacated this
sentence, but the House of Lords subsequently imposed a similar punishment. See
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 189-90.
185. See Landis, supra note 180, at 160-64.
186. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 9.
187. Howard v. Gosset, 116 Eng. Rep. 139, 147 (Q.B. 1845); see also Landis, supra note
180, at 164 (quoting the opinion).
188. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
189. See Landis, supra note 180, at 170.
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into the integrity of senators or representatives and into allegations of
corruption in the executive branch,190 Congress began issuing
subpoenas in 1827 to gather facts from private citizens to determine
whether it needed to pass new legislation.191
Like the British Parliament, Congress also employed an inherent
contempt power. Under this power, either House of Congress could
order its Sergeant at Arms to arrest an offender, who then would be
tried before the House or Senate and face imprisonment in the
basement of the Capitol. 192 Congress first exercised its contempt
power in 1795, when the House imprisoned a private citizen for
attempting to bribe three of its members.93 The House and Senate
also used this inherent contempt power to enforce subpoenas. 94
Congress's inquisitorial authority, however, differs from
Parliament's in one important respect. Whereas Parliament has
unchecked power to investigate any subject matter, in Kilbourn v.
Thompson,95 the Supreme Court placed a limit on Congress's
investigative jurisdiction. A House committee imprisoned Hallet
Kilbourn for refusing to answer the questions during a congressional
investigation into the failure of a real-estate pool in which he and a
federal depository had participated. Recognizing that neither the
House nor the Senate "possesses the general power of making inquiry
into the private affairs of the citizen,"'96 the Court held that the
House inquiry was unconstitutional: it was a "fruitless investigation
into the personal affairs of individuals [that] could result in no valid
190. See icL at 170-78.
191. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 192 (1957); see also Landis, supra note
180, at 168-91 (discussing the early history of Congress's subpoena power). On December
31, 1827, the House of Representatives passed a resolution authorizing the Committee on
Manufacturers to "send for persons and papers." 4 CONG. DEB. 862 (1827). At the time,
the House was debating whether to increase tariff rates and wanted to know what effect
such an increase would have on domestic manufacturers. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 192,
n.21. The resolution, which passed by the narrow margin of 102-88, was quite
controversial. Congressman Wood of New York argued that "the only cases in which the
House has a right to send for persons and papers are those of impeachment, and of
contested elections." 4 CONG. DEB. 882 (1827). He characterized the proposed
investigation as "an inquisition," "odious," and "oppressive." Id. at 883.
192. See James C. Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving
Executive Privilege Disputes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 145, 149 (1984).
193. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 148 n.4 (1935); Potts, supra note 182, at
719-20. The Senate first exercised its inherent contempt power in 1800. See Moreland,
supra note 2, at 192-94.
194. See Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 192, at 148-49.
195. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
196. Id. at 190.
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legislation.",197
Although the Supreme Court has professed fidelity to the
principle that Congress has no general power to investigate into
purely private conduct, 198 it has subsequently defined the scope of
Congress's investigative jurisdiction so broadly as to render the
Kilboum principle almost meaningless. The Court retreated from
Kilbourn in McGrain v. Daugherty,199 in which it held that "the power
of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function."2 ' Although acknowledging that
Congress has no " 'general' power to inquire into private affairs and
compel disclosures,"20' the Court explained that Congress "cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.' '202
The Court therefore held that Congress has the power to issue
subpoenas "to obtain what is needed" to legislate wisely.2?,
According to McGrain, Congress has subpoena power when the
subject of an investigation is "one in which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. ' '"2 °
Since then, while theoretically adhering to the Kilbourn principle
that Congress has "no general authority to expose the private affairs
of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the
Congress," 25 the Court has built on McGrain by defining Congress's
power of inquiry as covering
the whole range of national interests concerning which
Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation
not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining
what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to
appropriate. The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is
as penetrating and farreaching as the potential power to
197. Id. at 195.
198. See infra notes 201, 205 and accompanying text. Justice Stephen Field predicted
that Kilbourn would "stand for all time as a bulwark against the invasion of the right of
the citizen to protection in his private affairs against the unlimited scrutiny of investigation
by a congressional committee." In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 253 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1887) (Field, Circuit Justice).
199. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
200. Id. at 174.
201. Id. at 173-74.
202. Id. at 175.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 177.
205. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
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enact and appropriate under the Constitution."6
The Court has also held that, when Congress asserts its power to
investigate, courts may not examine Congress's motives for launching
an investigation,207  nor may they hold an investigation
unconstitutional because it results in no legislation 8
In defining Congress's power to investigate, the Court has also
allowed the House and Senate the discretion to delegate inquisitorial
authority to committees and subcommittees, which "are endowed
with the full power of the Congress to compel testimony. '209  To
delegate this power, the House or Senate must pass an authorizing
resolution that defines the extent of the committee's jurisdiction.210
On occasion, the Court has reversed convictions for contempt of a
committee subpoena because the authorizing resolution was vague21'
or because the information sought was not pertinent to the
investigation that the committee was authorized to undertake.1 2 But
even an unclear authorizing resolution does not necessarily doom a
committee's power to investigate, as the Court has examined a
resolution's legislative history,213 "'the remarks of the chairman or
members of the committee, [and] even the nature of the proceedings
themselves' "to cure ambiguities.2 4
In sum, McGrain and its progeny have given Congress and its
committees the authority to use subpoena power to investigate
essentially any subject matter. All that is required to exercise this
power is that the House or Senate pass an authorizing resolution and
206. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,111 (1958); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at
187 ("[Ihe congressional power to investigate encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.").
207. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508 (1975);
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399,412 (1961); Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200.
208. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 ("Nor is the legitimacy of a congressional inquiry to
be defined by what it produces.... To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no
predictable end result.").
209. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 202-04 (reversing a contempt conviction because the authorizing
resolution of the House Un-American Activities Committee was vague and the witness,
therefore, could not "reasonably deduce from the [authorizing resolution] the kind of
investigation that the Committee was directed to make").
212. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456,470 (1961); Sacher v. United States, 356
U.S. 576,577 (1958) (per curiam); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1953).
213. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 118 (1958) (distinguishing Watkins
by using legislative history to show "that in pursuance of its legislative concerns in the
domain of 'national security' the House has clothed the Un-American Activities
Committee with pervasive authority to investigate Communist activities in this country").
214. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408 (1961) (quoting Watkins, 354 U.S. at
209).
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that the area investigated be one in which Congress may legislate.
Kilbourn notwithstanding, someone who challenges a congressional
subpoena on the ground that Congress does not have the jurisdiction
to investigate a particular subject "engages in what is essentially a
'fruitless task.' "15
This broad inquisitorial power provides a possible constitutional
basis for Congress's power to immunize witnesses. McGrain
explained that the congressional subpoena power is premised on
Congress's need to obtain information required for an
investigation.216 Without the power to immunize witnesses, Congress
may not be able to compel critical testimony? 7 Thus, a number of
commentators have suggested that Congress must have an inherent
215. Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands
Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. RaV. 71, 75 n.28 (1986) (quoting Arvo
Van Alstyne, Congressional Investigations, 15 F.R.D. 471, 478 (1954)). The House Un-
American Activities Committee provides a good example of Congress's essentially
unlimited investigative jurisdiction. The Committee's main purpose was not to
recommend legislation. Rather, as Chairman J. Parnell Thomas explained, "'[t]he chief
function of the committee [was] the exposure of unamerican activities.' " 80 CONG. REC.
A4277 (1947) (quoting a radio address by Chairman Thomas on Nov. 4, 1947); see
generally Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 154-56, 163-66 (Black, J., dissenting) (reviewing the
history of the Committee); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-
19 (1991) (same). To achieve this end, the Committee subpoenaed witnesses and asked
them to describe their political beliefs and associations and those of other private citizens.
See Kreimer, supra, at 17. It then publicized the identities of people whom it considered
subversives, exposing them to opprobrium and loss of employment. See Barenblatt, 360
U.S. at 157-58 (Black, J., dissenting). Civil libertarians strongly opposed the Committee's
work. For example, Professor Harry Kalven, an eloquent defender of freedom of
association, argued:
[I]t is surely absurd to assume, as we solemnly appear to have done for years,
that [Congress's] best route to legislative insight is to inventory the Communists
in the United States one at a time. Whatever the motives of the congressional
committee, it has for the past ten years or more been assiduously collecting far
more information about the individual case than could possibly be necessary or
useful to rational legislative judgment. And these superfluous data have been
collected at a considerable price to individual privacy.
Harry Kalven, Jr., Mr. Alexander Mieklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 315, 327 (1960). Nevertheless, because Congress had the power to pass legislation
relevant to communism, the Court repeatedly held that the Committee was "pursuing a
valid legislative purpose." Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 410; see also Alan I. Bigel, The First
Amendment and National Security: The Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of
Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 885, 888-92 (1993) (reviewing
Supreme Court cases involving the Committee).
216. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
217. See Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 74, at 49 (noting that "many congressional
investigations are of offenses which could not be examined effectively" without
congressional grants of immunity).
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power to immunize witnesses even when doing so would "conflict
with the purposes of criminal justice. ': 218
The flaw in this argument, however, is that not all congressional
investigations are constitutionally alike. Parts IV and V explain that
although Congress has the authority to compel testimony related to
almost any subject, courts have limited Congress's inquisitorial power
when an assertion of that authority would encroach on the authority
of another branch of government or would otherwise disturb the
separation of powers. 19
IV. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS LIMITS ON CONGRESS'S
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY
A. The Inherent Contempt Power
For Congress to obtain the information it needs for an
investigation, it must have subpoena power and a "process to
enforce" its subpoenas.' ° Two mechanisms are available to punish
witnesses who refuse to comply with subpoenas-statutory contempt
and Congress's inherent contempt powerP' Because the
unrestrained use of the inherent contempt authority would subvert
the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has placed a
special limitation on this authority that does not apply when Congress
chooses to use the more conventional statutory contempt procedure.
218. Id.; see also Ghio, supra note 53, at 236 ("Although the courts have not seriously
challenged the authority for congressional grants of immunity, it is, at this point, probably
beyond review."); van Loben Sels, supra note 108, at 2386 (stating that "neither
Congress's inherent power to investigate nor its statutory power to immunize witnesses
can be seriously challenged"). Van Cleve and Tiefer acknowledge that "courts have
hedged the exercise of the powers to grant immunity and to conduct investigations by
insisting that their use not limit the constitutional rights of potential criminal defendants to
a fair trial." Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 74, at 49-50. They conclude, however, that
this judicial hedging does not limit the power of Congress to grant immunity. Rather, it
means only that Congress should exercise its immunity power prudently. See id. at 50.
219. At least two commentators have suggested, without elaboration, that
congressional grants of immunity are constitutionally problematic. See Miller, supra note
61, at 688 n.271 ("[D]eciding which laws to enforce and which individuals to prosecute is
an executive function and this allocation of power may limit Congress's ability to
unilaterally decide to scuttle a prosecution."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and
the Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1457, 1490 (1997) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 111)
("When Congress confers immunity in a legislative hearing or investigation, it impairs the
executive's ability to bring a subsequent prosecution. The result may be similar, in
practical effect, to a one-House or single committee veto on executive enforcement of the
laws.").
220. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174.
221. See infra notes 222-40 and accompanying text (discussing inherent contempt);
infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (discussing statutory contempt).
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Beginning in 1795, both Houses of Congress exercised the
inherent power to arrest private citizens, try them for contempt,
pronounce them guilty, and imprison them in the Capitol jail-all
without a statute222 or a criminal trial. Although Parliament had
exercised a plenary and unreviewable inherent contempt power since
the seventeenth century,' Congress's use of this authority appears to
blend legislative and judicial power in a manner normally prohibited
by the Bill of Attainder Clause,2 which prohibits Congress from
passing laws that inflict punishment on a named or described set of
individuals. 6  The Clause protects individuals from arbitrary
punishment by enforcing "the Framers' belief that the Legislative
Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and
juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying
appropriate punishment upon, specific persons." 7 If unchecked, the
inherent contempt power, like a bill of attainder, would allow a
House of Congress to act as a legislature that could define contempt
on an ad hoe basis, as a jury that could determine guilt, and as a judge
who could pronounce any sentence she wanted. Unrestrained
exercise of the inherent contempt power would concentrate
222. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
223. A prisoner can file a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of her
confinement, but the grounds for doing so are quite limited. See Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 177 (1880); cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 501 (1972) (noting that "the
panoply of procedural rights that are accorded a defendant in a criminal trial has never
been thought necessary in legislative contempt proceedings").
224. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder... shall be passed.").
226. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472-73 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-60 (1965). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW § 10-4, at 641-56 (2d ed. 1988) (reviewing Bill of
Attainder Clause case law). The Constitution also prohibits states from passing bills of
attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
227. Brown, 381 U.S. at 445; cf Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221
(1995) (describing the "sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial
power"). The Supreme Court has adopted Professor Cooley's explanation for the need
for a Bill of Attainder Clause:
Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and
organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the
people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor,
is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a
criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly
excited,-the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 445 (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
536-37 (8th ed. 1927)); see also TRIBE, supra note 226, § 4-9, at 244 (explaining that the
Bill of Attainder Clause "prevents Congress from circumventing the checks of the
executive and judicial branches by identifying the individuals who are to be burdened by
federal statutes").
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legislative and judicial power and lead to arbitrary punishment. For
this reason, former Solicitor General Rex Lee has observed that
"there is an uncomfortable similarity between direct contempt
proceedings and a bill of attainder. Both involve the legislative
branch in determining whether certain conduct should be punished
and what punishment is appropriate."'
The Supreme Court has never specifically compared the inherent
contempt power to a bill of attainder. The Court, however, has
sharply limited Congress's inherent contempt authority because of
the dangerous way in which it blends legislative and judicial power.
In Anderson v. Dunn,29 the Supreme Court upheld Congress's
inherent contempt power, but placed stringent limits on how it may
be exercised. The Court noted that the Constitution does not
explicitly grant Congress a contempt power,230 but concluded that
such authority is necessary because, without it, Congress would be
unable "to guard itself from contempts, and [would be left] exposed
to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even
conspiracy, may meditate against it."'" Nevertheless, the Court
observed that the inherent contempt power was "undefined" and had
been exercised with "a caprice which has sometimes disgraced
legislative assemblies. ' '112  To "set bounds" guarding against this
potential for abuse of power, the Court held that Congress's
contempt authority should be limited to "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed" 3 -- specifically, "imprisonment [that]
228. Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial
Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV.
231,254.
229. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
230. See id. at 225.
231. Id. at 228. The Court explained:
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and charged
with the care of all that is dear to them; composed of the most distinguished
citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of a great nation; whose
deliberations are required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the
public, and whose decisions must be clothed with all that sanctity which
unlimited confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire; that such an
assembly should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a
supposition too wild to be suggested.
Id. at 228-29; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 842, at 305 (1833) ("It is remarkable, that no power is conferred to
punish for any contempts committed against either house; and yet it is obvious, that,
unless such a power, to some extent, exists by implication, it is utterly impossible for either
house to perform its constitutional functions.").
232. Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 229,231.
233. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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must terminate" with the adjournment of the House or Senate.24
Thus, although the British Parliament enjoyed boundless power to
punish witnesses for contempt, Congress's power to do so unilaterally
has been limited substantially.
In Marshall v. Gordon s the Court reaffirmed and clarified
Anderson. 6 It noted that the British Parliament's broad inherent
contempt power "rested upon an assumed blending of legislative and
judicial authority." 7  To give Congress this same broad power
"would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between
legislative, executive and judicial authority which is interwoven in the
very fabric of the Constitution." 8  To maintain the separation of
powers, the Court limited the inherent contempt power to" 'the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed' "9 and reaffirmed that
"imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body
in which the contempt occurred.""24
Congress responded to the Court's limitations on its inherent
contempt power by passing a criminal contempt statute.2 41 Under the
234. Id.
235. 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
236. The Court has also recently relied on Anderson to limit the judiciary's inherent
contempt power. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801
(1987) (acknowledging that courts have the authority to initiate prosecutions for criminal
contempt, but stating that the "exercise of that authority must be restrained by the
principle that [in a contempt case only] ' "[t]he least possible power adequate to the end
proposed" '" should be used (quoting United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975)
(quoting Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231))).
237. Marshall, 243 U.S. at 533.
238. Id. at 536.
239. Id. at 541 (quoting Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231) (emphasis omitted).
240. Id at 542. Based on the facts of the case, the Court held that the House acted
unconstitutionally when it imprisoned H. Snowden Marshall for contempt because he had
published a "defamatory and insulting" letter about the House. Id at 532. The Marshall
Court explained that because Congress may only exercise inherent contempt power when
it is "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed," id. at 541 (emphasis
omitted), the power covers only "acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or
prevent the discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent
legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed." Id. at
542. An insulting letter was not such an act.
In its analysis, the Marshall Court did not mention the First Amendment.
Obviously, imprisoning someone for criticizing Congress would be flatly inconsistent with
the First Amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270,273 (1964)
(describing "the central meaning of the First Amendment" as embodying the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"). The Court decided
Marshall in 1917, well before modem First Amendment jurisprudence had developed.
241. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (1857) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 192,
194 (1994)). For a description of the minor modifications to the statue, see Russell v.
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statute, after the House or Senate certifies that a witness is in
contempt of a congressional subpoena, it is the "duty" of the United
States Attorney "to bring the matter before the grand jury for its
action." 242 Violators may receive a prison term of up to one year.243
Congress enacted this statute "because imprisonment limited to the
duration of the session was not considered sufficiently drastic a
punishment for contumacious witnesses,"2" particularly when
contempt occurred toward the end of a congressional session.245
From a separation-of-powers perspective, the differences
between inherent and statutory contempt are dramatic. In statutory
contempt cases, courts try witnesses, juries pronounce guilt, and
judges sentence those found guilty of contempt. Legislative and
judicial authority are not blended.
For our purposes, the comparison between inherent and
statutory contempt shows that Congress's investigative authority does
not exist in a constitutional vacuum. To conduct an investigation,
Congress must be able to issue subpoenas that are enforceable.
When Congress blends legislative and judicial authority by employing
its inherent contempt power, it may use only " 'the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed,' "246 namely imprisonment until
United States, 369 U.S. 749,756 n.8 (1962). In 1897, the Supreme Court upheld the statute.
See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897).
242. 2 U.S.C. § 194.
243. See id. § 192. A civil contempt statute that applies only to the Senate is codified at
2 U.S.C. § 288d (1994) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). The Senate
activates the statute by applying to a federal district court for an order compelling a
subpoenaed witness to testify. If the witness refuses to comply, he may be held in
contempt of court. See MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN
INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL
INQUIRY at 15 (CRS Rep. No. 95-464A, 1995).
244. Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935); see Brand & Connelly, supra note
215, at 74; Moreland, supra note 2, at 203-04. The contempt statute is a supplement to,
and not a replacement for, the inherent contempt power. See Jurney, 294 U.S. at 151;
Chapman, 166 U.S. at 672. Congress made use of both inherent and statutory contempt
until 1945, when it last employed the inherent contempt mechanism. See Hamilton &
Grabow, supra note 192, at 149.
245. See Brand & Connelly, supra note 215, at 74. For a time, some argued that
Anderson's limitation on a contemnor's prison term should not apply to the Senate
because the Senate is a continuing body with only one-third of its members elected for
each Congress. See Moreland, supra note 2, at 199 n.31. That argument has not prevailed,
though. In 1871, the Senate acquiesced in the applicability of Anderson. See id.
Moreover, although Marshall involved the House's use of inherent contempt, the
generality of the Court's statement that "imprisonment may not be extended beyond the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred" suggests that the Anderson rule
applies to both the Senate and the House. Marshall, 243 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
246. Marshall, 243 U.S. at 541 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,231
(1821)).
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the end of the congressional session. When it employs its inherent
contempt power, Congress blends legislative and judicial power by
trying a witness, finding him guilty, and pronouncing sentence. In
contrast, when Congress makes use of the statutory mechanism that
preserves the separation between legislative and judicial power, its
contempt authority is not so limited, and it may prescribe longer
punishments for contemnors.247 Anderson and Marshall demonstrate
that Congress's investigative power is curtailed when its exercise
would disturb the separation of powers.
B. Executive Privilege
Congressional investigations often focus on the conduct of the
executive branch.' In these inquiries, the executive branch
sometimes responds to congressional demands for information by
asserting the constitutionally based doctrine of executive privilege.249
When Congress subpoenas information that is protected by executive
privilege, it does not enjoy the broad subpoena authority described in
Part III. Instead, its subpoena power is limited to information that is
"demonstrably critical" to an investigationY0
Before examining the way in which executive privilege narrows
Congress's subpoena power, it is useful to explore the constitutional
basis of that privilege. In the leading case on executive privilege,
United States v. Nixon,21 the Supreme Court considered President
Nixon's assertion of the privilege in response to a federal district
court subpoena of taped conversations between the President and his
advisors. In holding that presidential communications are
" 'presumptively privileged,' "2 the Court explained that the
President enjoys an executive privilege based on "the supremacy of
each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties '' z53
and on "the valid need for protection of communications between
247. Of course, any statutory punishment for contempt would be subject to the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (discussing the Eighth Amendment's limits on the lengths
of prison sentences).
248. See generally GRABOW, supra note 23, §§ 2.2-.6, at 15-75 (reviewing the history of
congressional investigations).
249. See generally Miller, supra note 61, at 649-69 (reviewing the history of presidential
invocations of executive privilege).
250. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
251. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
252 Id at 708 (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,717 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
253. Id at 705.
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high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in
the performance of their manifold duties."' s4 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that the privilege is not absolute. To "ensure that justice
is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by
the prosecution or defense.""5  The Nixon Court held that "[a]
President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the
communications of his office is general in nature" 6  and is
outweighed by the "constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence" in a specific criminal proceeding Y 7
In a recent case involving the investigation of former Agriculture
Secretary Mike Espy ("Espy"), 8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit elaborated on the balance struck
by Nixon. The court held that a "party seeking to overcome a claim
of presidential privilege must demonstrate: first, that each discrete
group of the subpoenaed materials likely contain important evidence;
and second, that this evidence is not available with due diligence
elsewhere." 9  This standard applies to both grand-jury and trial
subpoenas 60
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on an executive-
privilege dispute between the President and Congress,2 61 the D.C.
Circuit resolved such a claim in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon ("Senate Select
Committee").262  President Nixon had asserted executive privilege
254. Id.
255. Id. at 709.
256. IdL at 712-13.
257. Id at 713.
258. In re Sealed Case ("Espy"), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Secretary Espy was
eventually tried and acquitted of illegally accepting gifts from entities that were regulated
by the Department of Agriculture. See Bill Miller, Espy Acquitted in Gifts Case; Jury
Clears Ex-USDA Chief on Thirty Counts Brought by Independent Counsel, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
259. Espy, 121 F.3d. at 754.
260. See icL at 756.
261. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 n.19 ("We are not here concerned with the balance
between [executive privilege] and congressional demands for information."); Espy, 121
F.3d at 739 n.10; Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of
Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REv. 461,
471 (1987).
262. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). Senate Select Committee is the only case
in which a court has resolved a dispute between the executive branch and Congress
regarding a congressional subpoena. In two other such disputes, the court declined to
reach the merits.
In United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Ford administration
sought to enjoin AT&T from complying with a House subcommittee's subpoena that
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after the Senate Watergate Committee subpoenaed tapes of five
conversations between President Nixon and White House Counsel
John Dean. Like the Supreme Court in Nixon, the circuit court noted
that "presidential conversations are 'presumptively privileged.' "263
This executive privilege applies "with at least equal force" when a
subpoena is issued by Congress rather than by a federal court.264 The
Court held that for a congressional committee to obtain evidence
protected by executive privilege, "the subpoenaed evidence [must be]
demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee's functions."265
The Committee's subpoena did not pass this "demonstrably
critical" test. The court explained that there were two possible
reasons why the Committee needed the tapes-to expose corruption
in the executive branch and to determine whether new legislation was
needed. Neither was sufficient to overcome the President's claim of
sought records related to certain warrantless wiretaps. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 122-23. The
administration contended that turning over these documents would jeopardize national
security. See id The D.C. Circuit observed that were it to decide the case on the merits it
would have "to balance the constitutional interests" of the executive and legislative
branches. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Because the court
thought that it would be difficult to balance these interests, it remanded the case and
suggested that the administration and the subcommittee negotiate a settlement. See id. at
395.
A year later, the parties were still unable to agree. See AT&T, 567 F.2d at 124-25.
The court then noted that the case turned on the allocation of foreign-affairs power
between the executive branch and Congress and that, on this subject, the Constitution
created a "zone of twilight" in which the distribution of power was "uncertain." Id. at 128.
Rather than navigating through the "zone of twilight," the court declined to rule in favor
of either party and instead devised a detailed plan that would help the parties reach
agreement and avoid future impasses. lId at 130-33. For criticism of the court's handling
of this controversy, see Fein, supra note 90, at 840 (characterizing AT&T as "wooly and
temporizing"). See also Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of "Advice and Consent":
The Senate's Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 469-70 (1997)
(discussing AT&T). Part VI of this Article discusses AT&Tin more detail. See infra note
352 and text accompanying notes 343-49 and 364-65.
In United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983), the
Justice Department sought a declaratory judgment that the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency had "acted lawfully in refusing to release certain
documents to a congressional subcommittee." Id. at 151. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed the suit as not ripe. See id. at 153. The opinion noted that
the House had cited the EPA Administrator for contempt. See id. at 151. The court
declined to rule on the legality of the Administrator's actions because that issue could be
resolved if the Administrator would raise it as a defense in a criminal contempt
proceeding. See id. at 153.
263. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 730 (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
264. Id at 731.
265. Id.
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executive privilege. The power of the Senate Committee to
investigate wrongdoing by the Nixon Administration was an
insufficient justification because the House Judiciary Committee was
conducting an impeachment inquiry at the same time and already had
copies of the subpoenaed tapes. The court, therefore, concluded that
the Watergate Committee's need for the subpoenaed tapes to
investigate President Nixon was "merely cumulative."'266 Moreover,
the Committee did not need the tapes to educate itself so that it could
recommend legislation:
There is a clear difference between Congress's legislative
tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution
engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative
judgments normally depend more on the predicted
consequences of proposed legislative actions and their
political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past
events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast,
the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its
ability to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit
267specific crimes.
Senate Select Committee's limitation on Congress's subpoena
power is dramatic. As we have seen, Congress normally has
jurisdiction to subpoena any evidence related to any subject on which
it may legislate.2 When executive privilege is not an issue, Congress
can subpoena "merely cumulative" 9 evidence and can use its
subpoena power to reconstruct past events-even those involving
purely private conduct.27" Were Nixon's tapes not protected by
executive privilege, challenging the Committee's subpoena would
have been a" 'fruitless task.' "271
What is the explanation for this drastic curtailment of Congress's
266. lId at 733.
267. Id. at 732.
268. See supra notes 188-91, 198-208 and accompanying text.
269. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 733.
270. For example, in Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962), the Court held
that Congress had the power to subpoena information about a union official's alleged
misuse of union funds. See id. at 614-22. In dissent, an incredulous Chief Justice Warren
declared that "it is incomprehensible to me how it can be urged that Congress needed the
details of how petitioner committed this alleged crime in order to pass general legislation
about union funds." l. at 636 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
271. Brand & Connelly, supra note 215, at 75 n.28 (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note
215, at 478).
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subpoena power? Although Congress enjoys broad constitutional
authority to investigate, denying the President executive privilege
would hamper his ability to perform his constitutional functions. It is
a bedrock separation-of-powers principle that one " 'branch [may]
not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.' ",272
The balance struck by Senate Select Committee is an effort to allow
both Congress and the executive branch to exercise their
constitutional responsibilities.273
V. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS'S POWER TO GRANT IMMUNITY
A. The General Rule
Anderson, Marshall, and Senate Select Committee teach that
although Congress normally maintains broad investigative authority,
that authority does not exist in isolation. Instead, it must be curbed
to avoid disturbing the separation of powers, either by blending
legislative and judicial power or by limiting the executive branch's
ability to function, This lesson helps define Congress's power to
immunize witnesses.
The Supreme Court has held that because Congress "cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change,"2 74 it
has the power "to obtain what is needed."'275 The power of the House
and Senate to issue and enforce subpoenas is unilateral. It is not
subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements that apply
to statutes.27 6 Congress sometimes needs testimony that it can obtain
272. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748, 757 (1996)); accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (stating
that one branch may not interfere with another branch's performance of its duties); Nixon
v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (explaining that although the
Constitution does not "contemplate[] a complete division of authority between the three
branches," one branch may not prevent another from performing its assigned functions).
273. Clinton v. Jones is a recent example of the Court's attempt to balance the
competing constitutional interests of two branches. The Court held that although "the
doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office," the potential burdens on the President
"should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of
discovery." Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705-06,707.
274. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
275. 1&
276. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957) (noting that the House or
Senate may pass an authorizing resolution empowering a committee to issue subpoenas);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,44-45 (1953) (same); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821) (upholding Congress's inherent contempt power). See
generally supra notes 188-214, 220-45 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
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only by granting immunity.277  Thus, Congress's investigative
authority must include some unilateral power to compel a witness to
testify by granting her immunity.
Although grants of immunity allow Congress to perform its
investigative function, they make it nearly impossible for the Justice
Department or an independent counsel to prosecute someone who
has provided public immunized testimony. In any such prosecution,
the Fifth Amendment would prohibit the government from putting
on any witness "whose testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by
compelled testimony regardless of how or by whom he was exposed
to that compelled testimony.""27 As the cases of Oliver North and
John Poindexter illustrate, because it is impossible to isolate potential
witnesses from public immunized testimony, this standard is nearly
impossible to meet.279
Congress's unilateral power to scuttle prosecutions conflicts with
fundamental separation-of-powers principles. Buckley, Bowsher, and
Morrison enjoin Congress from assigning itself any role in executing
the law.?' Chadha complements these cases by forbidding Congress
from using a legislative veto to control how the law is executed.?'
When it upends a prosecution, Congress interferes with the ability of
the Attorney General or an independent counsel to enforce federal
criminal law.
Anderson and Marshall show how to reconcile these separation-
of-powers principles with Congress's need to obtain immunized
testimony. To perform its legislative function, Congress originally
relied upon its inherent contempt power.' The inherent contempt
subpoena and inherent contempt power); supra notes 158-62 (discussing the bicameralism
and presentment requirement).
277. See Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 74, at 49. For example, the Senate Watergate
Committee immunized John Dean, see id. at 53, who broke open the Watergate scandal by
testifying for five days about the Nixon administration's attempt to obstruct the
investigation of the Watergate break-in. See FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 363-64
(1994). According to Sam Dash, the Committee's Chief Counsel, Dean would not have
testified if he had not been granted immunity, and Nixon might have completed his term
of office. See van Loben Sels, supra note 108, at 2396.
278. United States v. North ("North II"), 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
279. See United States v. North ("North I"), 910 F.2d 843, 851 (per curiam), modified
by North 11, 920 F.2d at 942; United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 312-13 (D.D.C.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 91-110
and accompanying text (discussing the cases).
280. See supra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 157-62, 167-69, 175-76 and accompanying text.
282. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,228-29 (1821). Because a criminal
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authority is, in part, judicial in nature, and Congress may not
ordinarily exercise judicial power.8 3 To preserve the separation of
powers, Anderson and Marshall limit Congress to " 'the least possible
[inherent contempt] power adequate to the end proposed.' "284 The
same logic should apply to grants of immunity. When Congress frees
a witness from prosecution, it plays a part in the execution of criminal
law; the Constitution normally forbids Congress from assigning itself
any role in the execution of the law. Congress's power to immunize
witnesses, therefore, should be limited to "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." 2 5
Senate Select Committee reinforces this reasoning. 6  The
President needs some guarantee of confidentiality to perform her
constitutional duties.' 7  Congressional subpoenas of material
protected by executive privilege impede the President's ability to
function. Thus, they are constitutional only if "demonstrably critical"
to a congressional inquiry. Similarly, congressional grants of
immunity impede the Justice Department or an independent counsel
from performing its constitutional function.m Therefore, as a general
rule, Congress should have power to immunize a witness only when
doing so is "demonstrably critical" to an investigation. This test,
which is a more concise formulation of the Anderson-Marshall
standard,1 9 reconciles Congress's need for immunized testimony with
core separation-of-power principles.
contempt statute now exists, the idea that Congress needs inherent contempt power seems
outdated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not cast any doubt on the continued
constitutionality of this congressional power. See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing
"the narrow principle of necessity underlying Anderson-that the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Branches must each possess those powers necessary to protect the functioning
of its own processes, although those implicit powers may take a form that appears to be
nonlegislative, nonexecutive, or nonjudicial, respectively"); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 495,
496 (1972) (explaining that "[tihe past decisions of this Court ... leave little question that
the Constitution imposes no general barriers to the legislative exercise" of the inherent
contempt power).
283. See supra notes 220-47 and accompanying text.
284. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917) (quoting Anderson, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) at 231) (emphasis omitted).
285. Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231.
286. See supra notes 262-73.
287. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,705-06 (1974).
288. Here, the Chadha analogy is apt-when it grants immunity, Congress "vetoes" a
potential prosecution. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983).
289. If immunizing a witness is not "demonstrably critical" to an investigation, it is also
not "the least possible power adequate" to conducting an investigation. See supra notes
233, 239 and accompanying text.
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B. Two Exceptions
1. Secret Testimony
Like many legal formulae, the "demonstrably critical" test has
exceptions. The first involves non-public testimony.
The root cause of the separation-of-powers problems associated
with immunity is that convicting someone who has provided publicimmunized testimony to a congressional committee is nearly
impossible.290 If, however, the witness were to testify in secret, these
constitutional problems would vanish and so, too, would the need to
apply the "demonstrably critical" test.
Recall that under the modem immunity statute, Congress does
not grant transactional immunity. Instead, it awards use and
derivative-use immunity, which permits "the government to prosecute
using evidence from legitimate independent sources.""29 Under this
statute, prosecutors have been able to convict defendants who
previously had offered immunized testimony to grand juries. One of
the reasons for this success is that grand-jury testimony is secret,192
making it unlikely that trial witnesses will be tainted by immunized
testimony as they were in the public hearings at issue in North and
Poindexter.29' If Congress heard immunized testimony in executive
session and took steps to prevent the dissemination of that testimony
to the public, the testimony would neither taint trial witnesses nor foil
a prosecution.
Secret testimony would eliminate the separation-of-powers
problems outlined earlier. Congress would discharge its power to
investigate without interfering with the ability of the Attorney
General to enforce the law. It would not play a destructive role in the
enforcement of criminal law. Then, there would be no need to apply
the "demonstrably critical" test, and Congress would be free to
immunize whomever it wished.
Although this scenario seems appealing, it raises a number of
questions. The first is whether Congress could ensure that potential
trial witnesses would not be exposed to immunized testimony. When
the Senate Watergate Committee petitioned the district court for
orders compelling a number of witnesses to testify under grants of
immunity, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox asked, to no avail, that
290. See supra notes 90-110 and accompanying text.
291. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
292. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
293. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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the Committee promise that it would "receive the testimony only in
executive session" and not "publicly release the transcript of the
testimony or any summary of it" or "make public statements about
the witnesses' testimony pending completion of the Committee's
investigation. '294  To minimize the possibility that trial witnesses
would be tainted, a congressional committee could abide by Cox's
suggestions and also promise to place immunized testimony in safes
and secure rooms, forbid photocopying, and limit access to a small
number of staff 95 These steps, however, would not be foolproof.
Congress often investigates topical and politically sensitive matters,
and the temptation to leak information is great.2 96 Nevertheless, if
Congress were to take these extreme measures, it could greatly
reduce the risk that a trial witness would learn enough about
immunized testimony to become tainted 97
294. In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361
F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (D.D.C. 1973).
295. Cf. Fein, supra note 90, at 816 (listing measures Congress could take to minimize
the risk that it would disclose classified information).
296. For example, in its investigation of the 1996 federal election campaign, the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee adopted a protocol guaranteeing that all depositions
would remain confidential until they were made "part of a Committee hearing or
Committee report." U.S. SENATE GOvERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM., SECURITY
PROCEDURES AND OTHER PROTOCOLS § 5 (1997), reprinted in CAMPAIGN-FINANCE
REPORT, supra note 110, at 8699, 8701. A number of depositions were leaked to the press
in violation of this protocol. See, e.g., Asides, Leak Shocks Democrats, WALL ST. J., July
11, 1997, at A14 (reporting that portions of a witness's deposition had been faxed to
reporters); Guy Gugliotta, Ickes Denies Arranging 'Hard Money' Campaign Calls, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at A7 (reporting that the Washington Post obtained a copy of Harold
Ickes's deposition regarding fundraising violations); Peter Knight, Perspectives on Molten
Metal, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at A24 (stating that despite committee counsel's
promise that a deposition would be kept confidential, it was leaked to the press); see also
JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS 273-300 (1976) (discussing leaks by the Senate Watergate Committee).
The Governmental Affairs Committee, however, did not take the measures suggested in
the text. The committee did not prohibit the duplication of deposition transcripts;
moreover, the transcripts were stored in unlocked file cabinets accessible by more than 70
majority and minority staff members.
297. During the Iran-Contra hearings, for instance, Congress maintained the
confidentiality of Admiral Poindexter's politically sensitive deposition:
[W]hen the Iran-Contra Committees made arrangements for an early deposition
of John Poindexter for investigative reasons, they agreed that the deposition
itself would be conducted and attended only by three senior staff attorneys for
the Committees, although the immunity orders were communicated to
Poindexter with a quorum of Committee members present. All notes of the
deposition were placed under seal immediately at its conclusion. Although
Poindexter's deposition covered the most sensitive political questions raised
during the entire Iran-Contra hearings, since much of his testimony dealt with
President Reagan's knowledge of and involvement in various events, there were
no leaks of this information prior to Poindexter's public testimony several
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A more fundamental question about secret immunized testimony
is whether Congress would find it acceptable. Congress's
investigative authority includes not only a power to gather facts, but
also the power to "publicize corruption, maladministration or
inefficiency in the agencies of the Government. 2 98 Woodrow Wilson
described the importance of this congressional power:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of
administration; and even more important than legislation is
the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the
people might receive from a body which kept all national
concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion....
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much
about what it sees.... [U]nless Congress both scrutinize
these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the
country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of
the very affairs which it is most important that it should
understand and direct. The informing function of Congress
should be preferred even to its legislative function. 99
The Supreme Court has embraced Wilson's characterization of
Congress's informing function.00
months later.
Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 74, at 58-59 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the
Iran-Contra Committees' efforts to prevent leaks, see Arthur L. Liman, Hostile Witnesses:
When John Poindexter and Oliver North Took the Stand in the Iran-Contra Hearings, They
Kept the Lid on a Presidential Scandal Far More Serious Than Today's, WASH. POST, Aug.
16,1998, (Magazine) at W16.
298. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,200 n.33 (1957).
299. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOvERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 297-303 (1885); see also 9 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with .the power which knowledge gives.").
300. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 n.33; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 n.6 (1951). In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979), the Court defined the limits of Congress's informing function. See id. at 132-
33. Senator William Proxmire had distributed a newsletter claiming that a federal grant to
behavioral scientist Ronald Hutchinson was wasteful. Hutchinson sued for libel, see id. at
118, and Proxmire claimed that the suit was barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S.
CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, which protects members of Congress from suits for conduct
"within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). The Court held that the Speech or Debate
Clause did not protect Senator Proxmire because the informing function refers only to
congressional hearings and committee reports and not to the press releases and
newsletters of individual legislators. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132-33.
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Thus, because Congress has used immunized witnesses to inform
the public about critical issues, it may be reluctant to limit its
informing function by hearing immunized testimony in executive
session. The nation, for example, first discovered the depth of
President Nixon's misconduct in Watergate from John Dean's public
immunized testimony. 10' Likewise, the citizenry learned much about
Iran-Contra from the public immunized testimony of Oliver North
and John Poindexter."° Members of Congress also may have less
pure motives for wanting to hear an immunized witness in public
session. A televised hearing can give a congressman valuable
publicity 3 and can be used to secure partisan advantage. Thus,
although Congress would be free to immunize whomever it wanted if
it were to keep immunized testimony secret, legislators will often
insist on public testimony.
2. Permission from the Attorney General or an Independent Counsel
Another situation in which the "demonstrably critical" test
should not apply would be when the Attorney General or an
independent counsel endorses a congressional grant of immunity.
Since The Laura and Brown v. Walker, it has been clear that a
Hutchinson does not cast any doubt on Congress's power to conduct public
hearings. The Court cited approvingly Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). See
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133. McMillan held that "authorizing an investigation pursuant to
which [materials] were gathered, holding hearings where the materials were presented,
preparing a report where they were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and
distribution of that report" were legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 313. The case also drew a distinction that supports
Congress's power to conduct public hearings---distributing a committee report to members
of Congress is part of Congress's informing function, but disseminating that report directly
to the public is not. See id at 316-17. The Court explained that the public can be
informed by an internally circulated committee report because the report, "unless
sheltered by specific congressional order, [is] available for inspection by the press and by
the public." Id at 317. Such a report is analogous to a public congressional hearing. The
public can "inspect" a hearing by attending it or watching it on C-SPAN, and it may avail
itself of media coverage of the hearing. Distributing a committee report directly to the
public would be analogous to mailing out videotapes of a hearing.
301. See supra note 277. James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel to the Senate
Watergate Committee, wrote that, "[i]t was Senator Ervin's view that informing the nation
immediately of the full parameters of the Watergate affair was the country's most pressing
need." HAMILTON, supra note 297, at 20.
302. Representative Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Iran-Contra Committee,
stated that congressional hearings "'were more important than the trial .... It has always
been my view that policy questions exceeded in importance the question of individual
criminal liability, and I do not think that Congress made a mistake in granting that
immunity.'" Haynes Johnson & Tracy Thompson, North Charges Dismissed at Request of
Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,1991, at Al (quoting Rep. Hamilton).
303. See Ghio, supra note 53, at 233-34.
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federal prosecutor's grant of immunity does not pose any separation-
of-powers problem."° If a unilateral decision by the Attorney
General or an independent counsel to grant immunity would not raise
any constitutional questions, then a joint immunity decision by a
congressional committee and the Attorney General or an
independent counsel would be constitutionally trouble free as well? 5
The problem is that Congress would not want to give federal
prosecutors veto power over immunity decisions. Under the modern
immunity statute, the Attorney General or an independent counsel
has thirty days to review a congressional immunity request °6 and to
"'lobby for a change of mind' on the part of [a] congressional
committee. '37 But, for good reason, the statute leaves the decision in
Congress's hands. The statute's legislative history refers to the
Teapot Dome scandal in which Attorney General Harry Daugherty
was accused of corruption. It declares that " 'it would be virtually
unthinkable to give the Attorney General the additional power of
disapproval of conferment of immunity, because in a Teapot Dome-
type congressional investigation the Attorney General himself would
be the focus of the inquiry.' "308 Even in investigations of other
executive branch officials, Congress would not want to be dependent
on the Attorney General's approval.
Aside from the concerns that would arise in investigations of the
executive branch, Congress would want a unilateral power to
immunize because its priorities often differ from those of prosecutors.
The congressional committees that investigated Watergate and Iran-
Contra immunized key witnesses over the objections of Archibald
304. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
305. Also, an endorsement of a congressional decision to immunize a witness by the
Justice Department or the Office of Independent Counsel would demonstrate that
prosecutors do not intend to pursue that witness or, for some other reason, feel that
granting immunity would not interfere with their work. Without this interference,
granting immunity would not raise any separation-of-powers problem. Thus, there would
be no need to apply the "demonstrably critical" test.
306. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005(b)(3), (c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 594(a)(7) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (expired June 30,1999).
307. In re Application of United States Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
655 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting 2 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 59, at 1406).
308. In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361
F. Supp. 1270, 1277 (D.D.C. 1973) (quoting 2 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIMINAL LAwS, supra note 59, at 1440). The court gave great weight to the Working
Papers of the National Commission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws because
Congress "relied heavily on the testimony of Commission members and adopted the
Commission's recommendations concerning immunity without significant modification."
Id. at 1275.
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Cox and Lawrence Walsh. The committees felt that uncovering the
truth was more important than prosecuting wrongdoers.'09 Cox and
Walsh, whom no one has ever accused of being overly friendly to the
Nixon and Reagan Administrations, had a different perspective.
Their job was to prosecute, and they naturally opposed measures that
would prevent them from accomplishing that task.310
Sometimes, however, the Justice Department does not object to
congressional immunity requests.3  On these occasions, the
"demonstrably critical" test would not apply. But often, Congress
and the Attorney General would not agree, and the test would limit
Congress's power to confer immunity.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE "DEMONSTRABLY CRITICAL" TEST
A. A Court's Task
Having determined that Congress should be able to hear public
immunized testimony over the objection of the Attorney General
only if that testimony is "demonstrably critical" to an investigation,
we must consider how a court would apply this legal standard.
Specifically, when would a court have the opportunity to decide
whether immunized testimony would be "demonstrably critical"?
What factors would guide its analysis?
The immunity statute provides an easy answer to the first of
these questions. Recall that Congress itself does not grant immunity.
Rather, after a congressional committee has notified the Attorney
General of its desire to hear immunized testimony, the committee
submits an application to a federal district court. 2 When Congress
wrote the immunity statute, it envisioned that district courts would
conduct "'a sort of declaratory judgment proceeding not on the
wisdom of conferring immunity,'" but on the legality of doing so."'
Thus, as Chief Judge Sirica explained when he granted the immunity
309. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
310. See Wright, supra note 42, at 437.
311. See, e.g., Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d at 1234 (noting
that the Justice Department did not object to a Senate subcommittee's decision to
immunize a witness in a probe of organized crime); Edward Walsh, Tamraz Defends
Political Donations; Access to Top Officials Was 'Only Reason,' Pipeline Promoter
Testifies, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al (reporting that the Justice Department
acquiesced in the decision of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee to
immunize three witnesses in the Committee's investigation of the 1996 election campaign).
312. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
313. United States Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1278 (quoting 2 NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 59, at 1441).
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requests of the Senate Watergate Committee, a court will order a
congressional witness to testify under a grant of immunity only if the
immunity statute's procedural requirements are satisfied,314 the
sought testimony is relevant to an investigation that has been
authorized by the House or Senate315 and that "falls within the total
constitutional scope of the congressional investigatory power, '316 and
the testimony is not protected by the First Amendment. 317 Judge
Sirica also added an important catchall-a court will deny an
immunity application if "it believes that the statute compelling
testimony may be unconstitutional as applied. 3 8
In this "sort of declaratory judgment proceeding," the district
court should apply the "demonstrably critical" test set forth in Senate
Select Committee. A grant of immunity that does not meet the
"demonstrably critical" standard would fit into Judge Sirica's
catchall-it would be an unconstitutional application of the immunity
statute.
The question of how a court should decide whether testimony
would be "demonstrably critical" to an investigation is more
complicated. A court would begin by determining what Congress is
investigating. As Part I discussed, Congress may empower its
committees to inquire into almost any subject 19 Before a committee
may conduct an investigation, the House or Senate must pass an
authorizing resolution that defines the committee's jurisdiction. For
example, the Senate authorized the Watergate Committee to
investigate "illegal, improper, or unethical activities" in connection
with the 1972 presidential election campaign and "to determine ...
the necessity or desirability of the enactment of new congressional
legislation to safeguard the electoral process by which the President
of the United States is chosen." 320 When a court is confronted with a
challenge to a committee's jurisdiction, it examines the text of the
authorizing resolution.32' If the resolution is ambiguous, it consults
the resolution's legislative history.321 Similarly, a court applying the
"demonstrably critical" test should use the authorizing resolution and
314. See id. at 1275-76.
315. See id. at 1279.
316. Id. at 1278-79.
317. See id. at 1279; see also supra note 68 (discussing the First Amendment's limits on
the power to investigate).
318. United States Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1279.
319. See supra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
320. S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., § 1(a) (1973) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/2:93-60).
321. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
322. See id.
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its legislative history to define the subject of a congressional
investigation.
Once a court determines what a committee is investigating, it
would then focus on whether subpoenaed material is "demonstrably
critical" to the committee's investigation. Although Senate Select
Committee does not explain in much detail what "demonstrably
critical" means, its choice of words is telling. "Demonstrably critical"
is a tough-sounding phrase, and that toughness is appropriate.
Immunizing a witness short-circuits the executive branch's power to
prosecute. Congress should have to show that it has no choice, that it
simply cannot conduct an investigation without granting immunity.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Espy z3 shows how demanding the
"demonstrably critical" test should be. Espy held that for a grand
jury or trial court to subpoena material protected by executive
privilege, two things must be true: "first, ... each discrete group of
the subpoenaed materials [must] likely contain[ ] important evidence;
and second, ... this evidence must not [be] available with due
diligence elsewhere. '34 Although Espy involved an attempt by a
grand jury, rather than a congressional committee, to interfere with
the executive branch's ability to perform its constitutional duties,
courts should use these same two criteria to determine whether
immunized testimony is "demonstrably critical" to a congressional
investigation. For one thing, both Espy and Senate Select Committee
involve attempts by investigative bodies-a grand jury in one case
and a Senate committee in the other-to subpoena material protected
by executive privilege. The same legal standard should govern both
types of subpoenas. More importantly, the Espy criteria are sensible:
if either criterion is not met, Congress can do without the evidence or
can obtain it by issuing a subpoena that does not interfere with the
executive's constitutional authority.
To see how a court should apply the Espy factors, let us return to
Senate Select Committee. In that case, the court evaluated whether
the Nixon tapes were "demonstrably critical" to an investigation of
the two subjects mentioned in the Committee's authorizing
resolution-recommending legislation and uncovering wrongdoing by
President Nixon.325 Although the court's reasoning is cursory and a
bit disorganized, its mode of analysis is similar to that called for in
323. In re Sealed Case ("Espy"), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
324. Id. at 754.
325. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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Espy.
Senate Select Committee essentially relied on the first Espy factor
to reject the Committee's argument that it was entitled to the Nixon
tapes to conduct an investigation into the need for new legislation.
The court explained that unlike a grand jury, Congress does not need
a "precise reconstruction of past events" to pass legislation.326 In fact,
it often legislates "on the basis of conflicting information. '327 The
Committee did not need to know exactly what happened in the
Watergate break-in and cover-up to evaluate the need for
legislation.32
The court's analysis is sensible and points to a general rule that
should apply when considering whether subpoenaed testimony would
likely contain important relevant evidence. When Congress is
investigating the need for future legislation, rather than inquiring into
executive branch misconduct, the Espy relevance standard probably
will not be met. On the other hand, when Congress is investigating
executive branch misconduct, it does need a precise reconstruction of
past events, and immunized testimony may be required 29
Senate Select Committee relied on something akin to the second
Espy criterion to reject the Committee's argument that it needed the
tapes to investigate the Nixon administration's misdeeds. The court
noted that the House Judiciary Committee, which was then
conducting an impeachment inquiry, already had copies of the
subpoenaed tapes. Thus, the Senate Committee's need for the tapes
was "merely cumulative." 330 The court's analysis is, for the most part,
consistent with the second Espy factor: if Congress already possesses
highly relevant information, why would enforcing a redundant
subpoena be "demonstrably critical" to an investigation?
The court, however, overlooked the fact that the House and
Senate are distinct, co-equal bodies. Although a House and Senate
committee conducting parallel investigations may choose to
cooperate with each other, they are not obligated to do so. One
House of Congress has no more authority to compel the other to
cooperate in an investigation than it has to compel the other to
cooperate in passing a law.33' Indeed, when different parties control
326. Id. at 732.
327. Id.
328. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (quoting the Court's language).
329. This general rule is, of course, not absolute; it is conceivable that, for a particular
bill, Congress may need to reconstruct the past.
330. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 732.
331. Cf U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
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the House and Senate,3 2 cooperation is unlikely. Thus, in applying
the second Espy criterion, a court should examine only whether the
particular congressional committee seeking to immunize a witness can
obtain the evidence it seeks from another source. Whether another
House of Congress or another congressional committee already has
the evidence is immaterial.333
Holding Congress to the "demonstrably critical" standard would
have two primary implications. First, as mentioned above, a
committee generally will not be able to immunize witnesses when it is
investigating the need for future legislation, rather than misconduct
by the executive branch. Second, a committee may have to delay an
immunity application until it has obtained enough information to
predict what an immunized witness would say and to show that this
prospective testimony satisfies Espy's relevance and availability
requirements.' 4 But when Congress can show that it truly needs
immunized testimony, Senate Select Committee would not stand in the
way.
B. The Political-Question Doctrine
Some might object to my proposal by arguing that if courts were
to apply the Senate Select Committee's "demonstrably critical" test,
they would become embroiled in politically contentious congressional
investigations. I will now consider two possible objections to this
judicial role.
The first possible objection involves the political-question
doctrine. Although the doctrine can be traced back to Marbury v.
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become[s] a Law, be presented to the
President .... "); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-51 (1983) (discussing the importance of
the Constitution's bicameralism requirement).
332. Between 1981 and 1987, for instance, the Republicans controlled the Senate, and
the Democrats controlled the House. See 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3-5 (1986); 39 CONG.
Q. ALMANAC 3-5 (1984); 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3-5 (1982).
333. A congressional committee conceivably could have the authority to compel
another committee in the same House of Congress to share information. Committees
obtain their authority from authorizing resolutions passed by the full House or Senate.
See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1953). The House or Senate could
include a clause in an authorizing resolution that would require a committee to share
information with another committee. In such a case, the committee with access to this
information should not have the power to compel duplicative immunized testimony.
334. See In re Sealed Case ("Espy"), 121 F.3d 729, 756-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The
primary effect of this standard will be to require a grand jury to delay subpoenaing
evidence covered by presidential privilege until it has assured itself that the evidence
sought from the President or his advisers is both important to its investigation and
practically unavailable elsewhere.").
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Madison,335 the leading case in this area is Baker v. Carr36 In Baker,
the Supreme Court surveyed its past decisions and found that the
political-question doctrine had "attributes which, in various settings,
diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness. '337
The Baker Court stressed that simply because a case involves a
political controversy does not mean that the political-question
doctrine applies? 38 The Court concluded:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution- without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from mutifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.339
These six factors are vague and not particularly useful in
determining what constitutes a political question 4 ° Since Baker, the
Court has encountered the political-question doctrine a number of
times and has held in all but two cases that the doctrine did not
apply.3M 1 Even after these decisions, many of which addressed the
335. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (explaining that "in cases in which the executive
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that
their acts are only politically examinable").
336. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
337 Id. at 210.
338. See icL at 217.
339. Id.
340. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6, at 144-45 (2d ed.
1994). Professor Chemerinsky explains:
For example, there is no place in the Constitution where the text states that the
legislature or executive should decide whether a particular action constitutes a
constitutional violation. The Constitution does not mention judicial review,
much less limit it by creating "textually demonstrable commitments" to other
branches of government. Similarly, most important constitutional provisions are
written in broad, open-textured language and certainly do not include "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards." The Court also speaks of
determinations of a kind "clearly for a nonjudicial determination," but that
hardly is a criterion that can be used to separate political questions from
justiciable cases.
Id. at 145.
341. The Court refused to apply the political-question doctrine in United States
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political-question issue in a conclusory fashion, the precise scope of
the doctrine remains unclear.42
The existing case law, however, suggests that the political-
question doctrine does not apply to congressional immunity requests.
For example, United States v. AT&T'43 addressed the doctrine, and its
consideration of the first Baker v. Carr criterion is particularly
Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 459 (1992) (reapportionment); United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387 (1990) (constitutional requirement that all
revenue measures originate in the House of Representatives); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S.
95, 102 (1989) (state constitutional provision requiring that members of a county board
had to be property owners); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetecean Society, 478 U.S.
221, 229-30 (1986) (Foreign Commerce Clause challenge to a tax measure); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1986) (gerrymandering); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,250 (1985) (Indian affairs); Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310,
1312 (1984) (opinion in chambers) (procedures used to ratify a constitutional
amendment); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 254 n.25
(1984) (congressional action regarding the Warsaw Convention); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 941-43 (1983) (legislative veto); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (termination
of public employees because of their political affiliations); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 697 (1974) (intra-branch dispute regarding executive privilege); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969) (decision by House to exclude a member); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (reapportionment).
The two cases holding that there was a political question are Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224,226-238 (1993) (procedures used in the Senate trial of an impeached federal
judge), and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973) (adequacy of the training of a
state's national guard). In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), although a majority of
the Court concluded that a challenge to the President's power to terminate a treaty
unilaterally was not justiciable, only four Justices relied on the political-question doctrine.
See id. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I am of the view that the
basic question presented ... is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves
the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations .... ").
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence. See id. at 1002.; see also id. at 997-1001 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (concluding, instead, that the issue was not ripe for judicial review); id. at 1006-
07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case was not a nonjusticiable political
question to the extent that "it rests upon the President's well-established authority to
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments").
342. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 340, at 142 (stating that "[i]n many ways, the
political-question doctrine is the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines"); LOUIs
HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 144 (2d ed. 1996)
("That there is a 'political question' doctrine is not disputed, but there is little agreement
as to anything else about it-its constitutional basis and scope; whether abstention is
required or optional; how the courts decide whether a question is 'political', and which
questions are."); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985) (noting that the political-question doctrine "has always
proven to be an enigma to commentators. Not only have they disagreed about its wisdom
and validity ... but they have also differed significantly over the doctrine's scope and
rationale"). Professors Henkin and Redish have argued forcefully that the political-
question doctrine should be abandoned. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-25 (1976); Redish, supra, passim.
343. 567 F.2d 121,126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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relevant in determining whether congressional grants of immunity are
political questions. In AT&T, the Justice Department sought to
enjoin AT&T from complying with a subpoena issued by a House
Subcommittee in an investigation of warrantless national-security
wiretaps. 4  The Department claimed that the documents sought
contained sensitive national-security information.' 4 The court held
that the political-question doctrine did not prevent judicial resolution
of the conflict between the Justice Department and the House
Subcommittee.? The court recognized that there was "a clash of
authority between two branches"4 7-- the executive branch's authority
to protect national-security secrets and Congress's authority to
investigate. Thus, in Baker terms, there was no "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment" to any one branch of
government.2 The same reasoning applies to a congressional
immunity application. The "demonstrably critical" test is an attempt
to balance two constitutional interests-the executive branch's in
enforcing the law and Congress's in conducting an investigation.
Neither Congress nor the executive has, to quote AT&T, "a clear and
unequivocal constitutional title" in a dispute over immunizing a
witness.349
United States v. Nixon is a useful benchmark for addressing other
Baker criteria. In Nixon, the Court curtly rejected the application of
the political-question doctrine.350 Instead, it proceeded to balance the
executive's need to preserve the confidentiality of presidential
communications with the judiciary's need for subpoenaed
testimony.3 1 As we have seen, that balancing test, which the D.C.
Circuit recently employed in Espy, is the same test a court would
apply when evaluating a congressional immunity application. In both
instances, the court's role is modest. The court simply evaluates the
relevance of evidence contained in subpoenaed material and whether
that evidence is available elsewhere. This task is certainly judicially
"manageable"352 and does not require a "policy determination of a
344. Id. at 122.
345. See id at 122-23.
346. See iL at 127.
347. Id at 126.
348. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
349. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127.
350. See United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696-97 (1974). For a discussion of Nixon,
see supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
351. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-14.
352. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. In AT&T, the court held that "'judicially discoverable
and manageable standards'" existed for resolving the dispute between the House
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."'353 It is the type of inquiry that
courts routinely perform." Indeed, the Senate Select Committee and
Nixon-Espy tests are far more manageable and far less policy-
oriented than, say, defining what the term "liberty" means in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The similarity between the Court's role in Nixon and the role a
court would play in evaluating an immunity application shows that
the remaining three Baker v. Carr criteria are inapplicable. Rejecting
an immunity request is no more disrespectful of Congress than
rejecting an assertion of executive privilege is disrespectful of the
President 56  There is no greater need to adhere to Congress's
"political decision" to grant immunity than there is to adhere to the
Subcommittee and the Justice Department. AT&T, 567 F.2d at 126 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217). That holding, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. In AT&T, the
court previously had refused to decide whether the Subcommittee's subpoena was
enforceable and remanded the case to request that the parties negotiate a compromise.
Id at 123. The court's justification for its sheepishness was that it would have been
difficult to "to balance the constitutional interests" of the executive and legislative
branches. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The balance
depended on the Constitution's distribution of foreign-affairs power. The problem, as the
court saw it, was that in foreign-affairs matters, the Constitution created a "'zone of
twilight'" in which the distribution of power was "uncertain." AT&T, 567 F.2d at 128
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)). The court avoided stepping into this murky area by devising a plan that it
hoped would avoid an impasse. AT&Ts citation to an "uncertain" "'zone of twilight'"
and its refusal to reach the merits resemble a holding that there were no "'judicially
discoverable and manageable standards'" and that the dispute, therefore, was a
nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 126 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
353. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
354. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401-15 (defining "relevancy and its limits" in federal
trials); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700 (holding that FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c), which governs
subpoenas duces tecum, requires that for a subpoena to be enforced, subpoenaed material
must be relevant, admissible, and specific).
355. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION 65-80, 97-117 (1991) (discussing a number of approaches that the Court
and individual Justices have taken in determining which rights are protected by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauses). For two quite different methods of
defining "liberty," see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 753-74 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment), Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120-30 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J.),
and id. at 127-28 n. 6 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
356. Courts would show no more disrespect in holding that a congressional grant of
immunity is unconstitutional than if they struck down a statute that Congress had passed.
This level of "disrespect" is not enough to create a political question. See United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990) ("[A] judicial finding that Congress has passed an
unconstitutional law might in some sense be said to entail a 'lack of respect' for Congress's
judgment. But disrespect, in [this sense], cannot be sufficient to create a political
question.").
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President's "political decision" that executive privilege applies?57
Finally, a disagreement between the judiciary and another branch of
government over immunity is no more embarrassing than is a
disagreement over executive privilege.
In addition to the inapplicability of Baker v. Carr's six factors,
the Court's long history of defining the scope of Congress's
investigative power demonstrates that evaluating an immunity
application would not be a political question. Although the Supreme
Court has never discussed the relationship between congressional
investigations and the political-question doctrine, as Part III shows,
since the 1880 case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Supreme Court has
ruled on a number of challenges to Congress's exercise of
358Thslninvestigative power. This long history belies the assertion that the
judiciary is incapable of resolving disputes relating to Congress'sinvestigative power.
C. The Speech or Debate Clause
Judicial scrutiny of congressional immunity applications not only
is consistent with the political-question doctrine, but also would not
offend the Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that
representatives and senators "shall not be questioned in any other
Place" for "any Speech or Debate in either House.- 359
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,36 the Supreme
Court held that, in some contexts, the Speech or Debate Clause limits
the judiciary's power to intervene in congressional investigations.361
Senator Eastland's Subcommittee on Internal Security had
subpoenaed bank records of the United States Servicemen's Fund
(USSF), which the Subcommittee suspected of subversive activities.
The USSF claimed that the subpoena violated its First Amendment
rights. It sued the members of the Subcommittee and sought an
injunction forbidding the enforcement of the subpoena. The Court
pointed out that the Speech or Debate Clause protects members of
Congress from being sued over actions that fall within the "sphere of
legitimate legislative activity."362  Because the Subcommittee's
investigation was a "legitimate legislative activity," its members could
357. Cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (noting that the political-question doctrine does not
apply simply because a case is politically controversial).
358. See supra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
359. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
360. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
361. See idJ at 501-11.
362. Id. at 503.
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not be named as defendants in a suit.3 63
As the D.C. Circuit explained in AT&T, however, the holding in
Eastland is quite narrow. In holding that the Justice Department's
suit was not barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, the AT&T court
cited a number of cases, including Senate Select Committee, as
evidence that courts have ruled on the validity of exercises of
Congress's investigative power.3 4 The court distinguished Eastland
from these cases on the ground that individual senators had been
named as defendants in Eastland. That distinction, the court stated,
"should not be dismissed as merely procedural, since it sheds light on
the nature and purpose of the protection afforded by the Speech or
Debate Clause. The Clause was intended to protect legislators from
executive and judicial harassment" and " 'from the burden of
defending themselves.' "365
AT&T is consistent with the Court's reasoning in Eastland.
Although the Eastland's Subcommittee's status as defendants made
the USSF's First Amendment claim nonjusticiable, the Eastland
Court recognized that, in a number of cases, it had ruled on First
Amendment challenges to the actions of congressional committees.
Those cases arose from statutory contempt trials in which
"defendants sought to justify their refusals to answer congressional
inquiries by asserting their First Amendment rights.""s The Eastland
Court explained that when Congress initiates a statutory contempt
proceeding, it makes "'the federal judiciary the affirmative agency
for enforcing [its power].' "367 When a congressional committee opts
to enlist the judiciary, it is not entitled to the protections of the
Speech or Debate Clause.
Eastland and AT&T show that the Speech or Debate Clause
would not prevent a court from applying the "demonstrably critical"
test. Under the modem immunity statute, a congressional committee
submits an application for an immunity order to the judiciary. Unlike
in Eastland, the committee is not the defendant in a lawsuit. Rather,
it seeks "the aid of the Judiciary to enforce its will.''" Because
Congress makes a court "the affirmative agency for enforcing '3 69 a
363. Id.
364. See United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 122, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
365. Id. at 129 (quoting Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503).
366. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 n.16.
367. Id. at 510 n.16 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
368. Id. at 509 n.16.
369. Id
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committee's power to immunize, the court is free to examine the
constitutionality of an immunity application.
Thus, neither the political-question doctrine nor the Speech and
Debate Clause precludes the judiciary from enforcing the
"demonstrably critical" test. This test calls upon courts to perform
the familiar and manageable task of judging the constitutionality of
an assertion of Congress's power to investigate.
CONCLUSION
For more than a century, Congress has exercised an unchecked
power to grant immunity to whomever it wants, at any time, for any
reason. This unlimited authority allows Congress to prevent the
executive branch from enforcing our nation's criminal law. Such
authority not only allows the guilty to escape justice, but it conflicts
with basic separation-of-powers principles.
The modern immunity statute gives the judiciary the means to
end this conflict by confining Congress's immunity power to its
proper, constitutional scope. If a court were to reject an immunity
application, Congress would surely protest. Congress would claim
that the court was inserting itself into politics. It would protest that
the court was not showing respect for Congress's power to
investigate. But the court would be doing no such thing. It would be
doing what courts are supposed to do-enforcing our Constitution.
370. If Congress were to rewrite the immunity statute so that a committee could issue
an immunity order without applying to a district court, the Speech or Debate Clause still
would not prevent a court from examining the committee's order. If the Attorney
General thought that a unilateral immunity order failed the Senate Select Committee test,
she could do what the Justice Department did in AT&T and seek to enjoin the witness
from complying with the committee's order. As in AT&T, the committee would not be
the defendant in such a suit, and the suit would be justiciable.
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